Explanatory update theory: Applications of counterfactual reasoning to causation  by Ortiz Jr., Charles L.
Artificial Intelligence 108 (1999) 125–178
Explanatory update theory: Applications of
counterfactual reasoning to causation
Charles L. Ortiz Jr. 1
Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Received 24 November 1997; received in revised form 10 March 1998
Abstract
A stratified view of causal reasoning is set forth; one in which the identification of counterfactual
dependencies plays an important role in determining what sort of causal connection, if any, exists
between two events named by a given pair of partial descriptions. A semantics for temporal
counterfactuals in which events are represented at the object level is then formalized based on a
syntactic form of belief updating. Counterfactuals are evaluated relative to an agent’s information
state, taken to include a set of initial beliefs together with additional assumptions to handle the frame
problem. Inertial inferences emerge as a side-effect of requiring minimal information change between
states of the world in some chronicle. A chronicle is, in addition, assumed minimal with respect to
an explanatory preference that minimizes the set of beliefs that are not part of an agent’s initial set of
beliefs or are not supported by some body of law-like knowledge. A number of epistemic preferences
that underly the choice of alternative worlds in accommodating a counterfactual supposition are then
examined ranging over types of knowledge, locality of action, and time. This leads to a semantics for
causation. Ó 1999 Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Since its inception, a major segment of the enterprise to formalize commonsense
reasoning has been directed towards problems involving reasoning about change with the
long term goal of, perhaps, uncovering some set of underlying general principles that could
one day serve as a theory of causation. However, the role of counterfactual reasoning in the
articulation of such a theory has often been either underplayed or vigorously contested. The
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reason for this appears rooted in an argument that runs along the following lines: whether
a given counterfactual, such as
(1) If that match had not been struck, it would not have lit.
is true or not depends on our understanding of change and law-like regularities in the world.
In this case, the truth of the counterfactual depends on knowledge of some causal law
which pairs up—under suitably restricted circumstances—events of striking a match with
its lighting. Ex hypothesi, causation stands as a more primitive notion than counterfactual
dependence.
In this paper, I will argue for a stratified view of causal reasoning; one in which the
identification of counterfactual dependencies plays an important part. Before doing so,
however, it is useful to review the sorts of problems in which causal knowledge plays a
role. Let us begin by supposing that an agent routinely has access to at least the following
sorts of information: (a) a world description,WD, of scenarios of interest in the form of
descriptions of events that occurred and states that actually obtained, (b) a body of law-like
knowledge, L, relating preconditions and effects to individual events, and (c) other, non-
causal knowledge,∆, such as definitional or constraint knowledge. Whereas L is meant to
include knowledge such as, “if block X is clear then after a puton(Y,X) action, block Y
will be situated on block X”, the knowledge contained in ∆ will contain knowledge such
as “if block X is on block Y then block Y is under block X”. Expressions contained in L
will be referred to as nomic expressions.
We can then characterize problems whose solutions involve some causal component as
follows:
Prediction: Given someWD up to time t together with L∪∆ and a sequence of actions,
α, performed at time t , derive the sequence of state transitions resulting from the
performance of α;
Planning: Given someWD up to time t together with L ∪∆ and a description of some
desired future state, GOAL, derive a hypothetical sequence of actions fromWD whose
effect would be GOAL;
Diagnosis: Given some partial WD of observations—to include, as well, some fault,
F—and a knowledge base, L ∪ ∆, compute a more complete or revised WD which
explains F .
Induction: Given sets of WDs produce some L which can explain the regularities ob-
served in theWD.
Of course, these categories are not mutually exclusive: planning certainly involves
prediction but is somewhat more difficult in that one is only given the goal state and must
find the sequence by which one could arrive at that state. Similarly, diagnosis certainly
involves some prediction but, unlike planning, is characterized by incompleteness inWD.
The focus of this paper, however, is instead on what I will label the problem of causal
attribution:
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Causal attribution: Given partial descriptions, α and β , of two events, together with
L ∪ ∆ ∪WD, determine the causal connection, if any, that exists between the event
named by α and the event named by β . 2
Causal connections between events are usually captured by way of some commonsense
causal language involving terms such as causes, forces, enables, prevents, helps, hinders,
and lets. The task of causal attribution is then complicated by two factors. The first stems
from the inherent opacity of such causal relations and the potentially unlimited number
of descriptions with which one can refer to an event; whereas some pairs of alternate
descriptions may represent genuine causal connections others might not: while John’s
answering the phone loudly caused Mary to become startled might represent a true causal
report, John’s saying hello before asking for a favor caused Mary to become startled might
not. One cannot, therefore, simply read off the “connections” between event descriptions
specified in L: there are simply too many of them; many of these descriptions must be
formed by way of knowledge in ∆. Secondly, whereas in planning and prediction one can
take a given event description, α, and check whether some later occurrence of a β follows
as a means of predicting the consequences of α, one cannot apply the same strategy to
determining whether α caused β , as the example just given demonstrates. The problem of
how to avoid such spurious connections is, of course, well known [80,81]. Approaches that
sidestep this problem by restricting causal inferences to only those conclusions that follow
from a set of causal rules of a special form, also restrict the applicability of such causal
rules to arbitrary event descriptions [80].
1.1. The role of counterfactual reasoning
Counterfactuals represent useful tools for identifying the role that some event played in
a larger nexus of events: the intuition is simply that in considering what role some α might
have played in some β one should “imagine” the consequences to β of α not occurring.
For example, in the example given above, John’s answering the phone loudly caused Mary
to become startled is true because, counterfactually, if John had not answered the phone
loudly then Mary would not have become startled. Here, negation is given narrow scope:
that is, the counterfactual is interpreted as: “if John had answered the phone, but not loudly,
then Mary would not have become startled”. In contrast, the report John’s saying hello
before asking for a favor caused Mary to become startled does not hold because John’s
saying hello after asking for a favor would not have changed Mary’s startled state (again,
negation is given narrow scope). In evaluating such counterfactuals one must naturally
imagine that everything else remained the same, for example, that John did not instead
blow a loud horn into the receiver.
Counterfactuals can also prove useful in expressing many important causal relations:
relations such as preventions as well as acts of, for example, maintaining, letting, and
coercion all call for a counterfactual analysis. For example, one natural way to define
a prevention of some β is to identify it with some actual event, α, whose absence of
2 Either α or β or both can involve arbitrarily complex descriptions including references to “negative events”.
The ramifications of this will become clear in a later section.
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Fig. 1. The task of causal attribution involves a number of levels of reasoning. Counterfactual reasoning mediates
reasoning between a level that draws inferences from generic laws of change (bottom of figure) and a level whose
role is the generation of commonsense causal explanations.
occurrence might have resulted in β . Similarly, one natural way to verify that a causal
connection did indeed exist between two actions is to say that α caused β just in case both
α and β occurred and if α had not occurred β would not have occurred.
Fig. 1 illustrates the solution to the problem of causal attribution which will emerge in
this paper; one in which counterfactual reasoning plays only one—albeit important—part.
As illustrated, the most basic level (bottom of the figure) consists of reasoning involving
axiomatic theories of change of the sort that have evolved from, for example, the situation
calculus [63] together with other, possibly static, knowledge. These theories quantify over
generic properties of events or situations. This level is also concerned with the treatment
of the frame problem. The role of the next level is twofold: to supply mechanisms that
ensure that spurious causal connections are blocked and also to extend the usefulness of
the generic knowledge contained at the first level to particular events and situations. This is
accomplished through counterfactual reasoning. The final level attends to the explanatory
side of commonsense causation. A causal explanation consists of two parts: (i) the choice of
suitable commonsense causal term that best expresses the relation between the two target
event descriptions (causes, prevents, enables, helps, etc.), and (ii) the choice of salient
causing or antecedent event: for example, whereas striking a particular match might cause
it to light, that striking event stands in the same counterfactual relation with the lighting of
the match as does the presence of oxygen. The former event, however, might be highlighted
for whatever pragmatic reasons are significant. In the remainder of this paper, I will not
concern myself with (ii) and in only a limited way with (i): several companion papers
examine the semantics of such terms in more detail [72–75].
1.2. Organization of paper
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I review possible
worlds and information-change approaches to the semantics of counterfactuals and discuss
technical problems. I then present a representation language and its semantics in Section 3;
the analysis to follow is framed within that language. This leads in Section 4 to a
presentation of Explanatory Update Theory (EUT) and a solution to the frame problem.
EUT is then used as a foundation in which the subsequent semantics for counterfactuals is
embedded; this is discussed in Section 5 and applied to a counterfactually-based semantics
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for causation in Section 6. Section 7 examines a number of benchmark problems that test
and demonstrate these ideas. Finally, Sections 9 and 8 summarize this work.
2. Background
2.1. Possible world approaches to counterfactuals
Perhaps the most widely accepted theory of counterfactuals is that of David Lewis
[53,59]. Lewis’ theory is based on the notion of similarity among possible worlds: a given
counterfactual φ > ψ (read “if φ had been the case then ψ would have been the case”) is
true just in case ψ is true in all of the closest possible worlds where φ is true. The intuition
behind the approach is very compelling: consider a situation in which a traffic light has just
turned red causing a car to stop and a truck driving in the other direction to proceed. Now,
take the counterfactual,
(2) If that car had not stopped at the light, it would have collided with the truck.
This counterfactual appears true; the manner in which we seem to arrive at its truth
involves imagining other states of affairs (possible worlds) in which the driver’s actions
had differed in the manner indicated by the antecedent of the counterfactual. In those
worlds that differed as little as possible from the real world—say, those worlds in which,
for whatever reason, the driver simply neglected to stop while the truck remained on its
course and did not stop—the car and truck collided. From a computational perspective,
however, the difficulty in applying this theory is rooted in the problem of formalizing a
similarity metric. Can such a metric be domain independent? Given the inherently fuzzy
nature of counterfactuals and the fact that they are not open to confirmation, can one really
hope for the existence of a unique similarity measure?
These are very difficult questions. Lewis [56–58] made some rough suggestions for a
similarity measure, focusing on applications of counterfactuals to causal reasoning. For
example, he argues that counterfactuals are inherently asymmetric with respect to time,
suggesting that any similarity measure should prefer similarities in the past to those in the
future [57]. Thomason and Gupta [87] also discuss the problem of temporal asymmetry,
focusing on issues of tense arising in the evaluation of conditionals expressed in natural
language. They adopt a possible worlds approach involving a branching temporal structure
in which preference is given to the stability of the past.
2.2. The link to information change
The tools which I will make use of in the analysis that follows belong to formal systems
that model aspects of information change; these have been the subject of a great deal of
interest in recent years (see, for example, [24,25,27,28,91,92,97]). The relation between
these frameworks and counterfactual reasoning originates in a proposal by Ramsey [77],
which has since become widely known as the Ramsey Test:
To evaluate the counterfactualφ >ψ , given a set of beliefs, S, add φ to S while at the
same time making only minimal modifications to S in order to maintain consistency.
If ψ holds in the resulting belief state then the counterfactual is true.
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Fig. 2. An overhead view of a group of dominos arranged so that when domino A falls then B falls. The group
then branches into two parts so that domino B causes both domino C and domino E to fall at the same time
followed by the remainder of the dominos in each of those branches, followed by G and H .
The difference between the Ramsey Test and Lewis’ approach is that the former’s focus is
on sets of sentences as models of beliefs rather than possible worlds.
The choice of which beliefs to discard or add to S in order to maintain consistency
with the counterfactual supposition is usually determined by some set of preferences or
orderings on beliefs. For the most part, preferences over one’s beliefs have been expressed
by either counting strategies or domain-dependent stipulations. Counting strategies involve
preferences to theories or models in which the fewest number of changes to the original
belief set are admitted. The approach recommended by Ginsberg [28] suggests that certain
law-like knowledge should as well be protected from revision and further that it is often
useful to impose some a priori ordering on beliefs. In order to apply approaches based on
the Ramsey Test it is necessary to delve more deeply into the minimality conditions that
underly those approaches. This must be done with an eye towards the particular application
at hand; in this case, that of causal reasoning. I will refer to this problem as the preference
problem for counterfactuals.
2.2.1. The preference problem for counterfactuals
Ginsberg’s work on counterfactuals was the first major attempt at investigating the role
of counterfactuals to problems in AI [28]. Though he termed his approach a “possible
worlds” approach, it was really an application of the Ramsey test. His suggestion is the
following. Let T be a satisfiable set of sentences in some logical language and let:
W(p,T )= {T ′ ⊆ T | T ′ 6|= ¬p,T ′ ⊂U ⊆ T ⇒U |= ¬p}. (1)
This is the set of maximal subsets of T , defined by set-inclusion, consistent with p, i.e., the
set of subsets of T closest to p. W(p,T ) is referred to by Ginsberg as the set of possible
worlds for p in T . The counterfactual p > q is then true just in case,{
T ′ ∪ {p} | T ′ ∈W(p,T )} |= q. (2)
In the language of belief change, the revision of theory T with p, written T ∗ p, is just
the set on the left-hand side of (2).
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Now, consider the following example 3 in which a group of dominos is arranged as
shown in Fig. 2. Let us say that at time 1 all the dominos are up and domino A falls. This
example will be formalized in a sorted, first order logic with sorts for events, time, fluents,
and objects. The language contains two predicates: occurs(e, t), reporting the occurrence
of an event, e, at time, t ; and holds(f, t), reporting that fluent f is true at time t . There are
two fluents in the language: up(y), and next(u, v), describing a state of domino y being
upright, and the state of domino v being next in line to fall relative to u (i.e., to the right
of), respectively. There is one event described by the term, fall(x), for an event of domino
x falling (in the right-hand direction). In addition, for simplicity, let us assume that the
values of the time constants range over the integers. We can then axiomatize this example
as follows.
WDchain = {occurs( fall(A),1)} ∪ Pos∪ Locs
Obj= {A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H }
Pos= {holds(up(x),1) | x ∈Obj}
Locs= {holds(next(A,B),1),holds(next(B,C),1),holds(next(C,D),1),
holds(next(B,E),1),holds(next(E,F),1),holds(next(F,G),1),
holds(next(G,H),1),holds(next(D,G),1)}
We will also have a nomic expression which says that if some domino, x , is up at time t
and falls then it will be down at time t + 1, as well as a rule for causal chains:
holds(up(x), t)∧ occurs( fall(x), t)⊃¬holds(up(x), t + 1) (3)
occurs( fall(x), t)∧ holds(next(x, y), t)∧ holds(up(y), t)
⊃ occurs( fall(y), t + 1) (4)
Since a general solution to the frame problem is not an immediate concern here, 4 we will
also need the following frame axioms which say, respectively, that an upright domino will
remain so unless it falls, the locations of the dominos are constant, and once a domino is
down it stays down:
Frames= {holds(up(x), t)∧¬occurs( fall(x), t)⊃ holds(up(x), t + 1), (5)
holds(next(x, y), t)⊃ holds(next(x, y), t + 1), (6)
¬holds(up(x), t)⊃¬holds(up(x), t + 1)} (7)
Finally, we have the following: (i) unique names assumptions ((9), (10) and (11)) and
(ii) domain closure axioms ((12) and (13)). Let x and y range over constants standing for
dominos, t and t ′ range over time constants, and let N stand for the integers:
3 I will use this example throughout the paper to motivate the sorts of preferences that a counterfactually-based
theory of causation should incorporate.
4 But see comments below and Section 4.
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Dom= (8)
{x 6= y | x ∈Obj & y ∈Obj− {x}} (9)
∪{t 6= t ′ | t ∈N& t ′ ∈N− {t}} (10)
∪{ fall(r)= fall(s)⊃ r = s} (11)
∪{∀x.x =A∨ x =B ∨ x =C ∨ x =D ∨ x =E ∨ x = F ∨ x =G∨ x =H } (12)
∪{t = 1∨ t = 2∨ · · · ∨ t = n | n ∈N} (13)
Unfortunately, we still are not able to prove rather obvious facts about our scenario: for
example, that dominos D and F fall at time 4. The reason is well known: we have not
ruled out the possibility of a mysterious fall of any of the dominos. Again, we do not
want to have to stipulate this fact; rather, we would like this to represent a consequence
of our commonsense knowledge. Of course, many solutions to this have been proposed;
I will later adopt an approach that minimizes unsupported change, a variation of Motivated
Action Theory [86]. For now, let us simply stipulate this by replacing axiom (4) by the
following which says exactly when a fall can occur:
occurs( fall(x), t)∧ 26 t 6 6≡ (14)
(occurs( fall(y), t − 1)∧ holds(next(y, x), t − 1)∧ holds(up(x), t))
Similarly, the following replaces axioms (3), (7) and (5) and stipulates exactly when a
domino is up or down:
16 t 6 5⊃
(¬holds(up(x), t)∨ (holds(up(x), t)∧ occurs( fall(x), t)))≡
¬holds(up(x), t + 1) (15)
Let L be the union of the set consisting of axioms (6), (14), (15) and Dom plus axioms for
addition. Consider the following counterfactual and causal queries, letting T = L ∪WD
in (1) and (2), in the context of the following hypothesis:
Causal reduction hypothesis (CRH). Whether α caused β is true or false can be reduced
to determining whether the counterfactual, if α had not occurred then β would not have
occurred, is true or false.
Predictive counterfactuals and causal direction. This example illustrates a certain tem-
poral asymmetry characteristic of some counterfactuals [44,57]. Consider the counterfac-
tual consequences of domino C not falling. The first decision with which we are faced is
whether or not to allow the initial locations (with respect to the predicate next) to change.
Clearly we do not; again we would like this to fall out of some general principle; however,
for now, we can assume that L as well as Locs are protected. Applying the definition for>
we will now have
¬occurs( fall(C),3) >¬occurs( fall(B),2)
¬occurs( fall(C),3) >¬occurs( fall(E),3)
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In the first case, we have that if C had not fallen thenB would not have fallen. In the second
case we have that if domino C had not fallen at time 3 then neither would domino E have
fallen. This is because we are considering minimal modifications to our world description
that do not conflict with the counterfactual supposition. This involves removal of one of
the following (keeping Dom and L protected):
{holds( fall(A),1),holds(up(A),1),holds(up(B),1),holds(up(C),1)}
In each of the belief sets resulting from the removal of one of these, we have
¬occurs( fall(B),2) and ¬occurs( fall(E),3), respectively, and therefore the counterfac-
tuals hold. Applying the CRH, these counterfactuals would sanction the incorrect conclu-
sions that C’s fall causedB’s fall (reverse causation) andC’s fall causedE’s fall (causation
across independent branches).
Explanatory counterfactuals. All counterfactuals are not like those in the preceding
example. There appears to be a use for counterfactuals whose right-hand side refers to
the past; for example, in explanatory or diagnostic situations [44]: the counterfactual “if
C had not fallen, it would have had to have been the case that A or B did not fall either”
seems perfectly reasonable.
Preemption. Cases of preemption also pose problems for the CRH [41,53]. Consider the
following variation in which the world description is instead:
WDbranch= {occurs( fall(F ),1),occurs( fall(C),1)} ∪ Pos∪ Locs (16)
with L as before. With one caveat, a direct application of the CRH with the goal of
showing that the fall of domino F caused the fall of domino G will not be successful
because domino F ’s fall actually preempted D’s fall causing G to fall. The caveat is that
this depends crucially on what we take “G’s fall” to refer to. Should it include the time
exemplified by that particular fall? If so, there is no problem as we will have:
¬occurs( fall(F ),1) >¬occurs( fall(G),2)
I will suggest that it should so that such cases do not present a problem; however, this
problem comes up in other, more problematic, contexts. 5 For example,
(3a) Driving at 80 miles per hour caused him to get a ticket.
(3b) Taking the rook caused him to lose the game.
In the first case, it is not necessarily the case that if he had not driven at 80 miles per hour—
say, if he had driven at 79 miles per hour—he would not have received a ticket. Similarly,
in the second example, the chess situation might have been such that if he had not taken
the rook he might have lost anyway by other means.
5 Indeed, one could conjure up a more complex arrangement of dominos so that G would fall at the same time
it would otherwise have.
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Event decomposition. Another example of a counterfactual dependency which will not
support the CRH is the following [49]. In this variation, let L include the following defini-
tion of the group event, trio−fall(x, y, z), of dominos x,y , and z falling simultaneously,
Ltrio= {occurs(trio−fall(x, y, z), t)≡
occurs( fall(x), t)∧ occurs( fall(y), t)∧ occurs( fall(z), t)} ∪L
and the world description be given by:
WDtrio = Pos∪ Locs∪ {occurs( fall(C),1),occurs( fall(D),1),occurs( fall(E),1)}
Now, we will conclude that,
¬occurs( fall(D),1) >¬occurs(trio−fall(C,D,E),1)
By the CRH, the fall of dominoD caused the fall of the group. This is clearly false: the fall
ofD simply represented a part of the event of the group falling. If counterfactual reasoning
represents a necessary condition for the existence of a causal connection, it does not seem
to represent a sufficient one. Perhaps one could argue that a causal connection could be dis-
counted on the grounds thatD falls contemporaneously with C andE, together with a gen-
eral principle that causation is not instantaneous. However, this will not do as we now see.
Simultaneous causation. Imagine sliding some rough object along a very delicate surface.
It seems reasonable to admit some commonsense notion of a simultaneous cause and effect:
as the object is moved it scratches the surface:
occurs(slide, t)∧ holds(touching, t)⊃ occurs(scratched, t)
We want a theory to support the fact that the sliding caused the scratching while precluding
the possibility of:
¬occurs(scratched, t) >¬occurs(slide, t)
Though this is not necessarily a problem endemic to a counterfactual approach, it does
rule out the suggestion made in the last point. As already pointed out, causal rules have
an implicit direction [85]; however, their directionality is not a consequence of temporal
adjacency (i.e., a requirement for nonsimultaneity).
Event naming: method-of relations. Consider the variation in which I am arranging the
dominos as indicated in the figure and I tell a child observing me not to knock down the
dominos or he will be punished. Suppose further that he nevertheless does. Let φ stand for
my warning to the child and add the following axioms to L:
occurs(knockdown(i, x), t)∧ holds(φ, t)⊃ occurs(disobeys(i), t)
occurs(knockdown(i, x), t)∧ holds(φ, t)⊃ occurs(punish(Me, i), t + 1)
occurs(knockdown(i, x), t)∧ holds(up(x), t)⊃¬holds(up(x), t + 1)
We would not want to conclude that the child’s knocking down the dominos caused him to
disobey me (though it did cause him to be punished) [49]; that is, even though the following
counterfactual is true,
¬occurs(knockdown(Child,A), t) >¬occurs(disobey(Child), t)
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we would rather say that knocking down the dominos was a method or way of disobeying
me. Alternatively, we might choose to say that the descriptions “disobeying” and “knocking
down” were alternative descriptions to the same event. 6 Again, this suggests that if
a counterfactual dependency represents a necessary condition for identifying a causal
connection, it does not represent a sufficient one.
Explanatory knowledge. Suppose only block H is visible to us but we know of the
existence of the arrangement shown in the figure. In such a situation, it would be reasonable
for one to entertain the following rule: “If blockH falls, block A must be down”. Suppose
we now knock down block H . Will block A fall? Clearly not [28,51]. However, we have:
occurs( fall(H), t) >¬holds(up(A), t)
There is an important distinction to be had here between bona fide causal knowledge of the
sort we described in L and the sort of explanatory knowledge described in this example.
A commonsense causal language. Commonsense causal discourse makes use of many
other types of causal relations. Suppose in our original example, I include the action
grasp(x) whose effect is to prevent a domino, x , from falling when it is struck by its
neighbor:
occurs(grasp(x), t)∧ occurs( fall(x), t)⊃ holds(up(x), t + 1)
together with the appropriate modification of the original axioms in L. For example,
occurs( fall(x), t)∧ holds(next(x, y)∧ up(y), t)∧¬occurs(grasp(y), t)
⊃¬holds(up(y), t + 1)
Suppose further that I choose not to hold a particular domino; that is I, in effect, let the
referenced domino fall by not holding the domino. Then, even though the counterfactual
occurs(grasp(B),2) >¬occurs( fall(B),2)
is true, it is not the case that I thereby caused the domino to fall. There appear to be a
number of important types of causal connections that we frequently make with the aid of
commonsense causal language and a counterfactually-based theory must be sensitive to
such distinctions.
Fine example. Fine [19] observed the following difficulty with Lewis’ idea of similarity
among possible worlds (Ginsberg’s approach, without additional preferences, suffers from
the same problem). Suppose a situation occurs in which none of the dominos fall and
that fact is recorded inWD. Then, if we consider the causal consequences of A falling we
might prefer a smaller difference—the introduction of a grasp action somewhere to prevent
all of the additional dominos from falling.
6 NB: I am not addressing the question of whether knocking down the dominos could be viewed as bringing it
about or, perhaps, caused it to be the case that my wishes were ignored. That is a separate, orthogonal question.
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2.3. Summary of technical problems
The preference to protected facts alone is too weak to decide whether some counterfac-
tual is true or not: often we can only conclude a disjunction of possibilities. Furthermore, it
is not difficult to show that the preference problem arises in other approaches as well [10].
Hence, the following secondary hypothesis:
Counterfactual preferences hypothesis (CPH). The preferences which guide the choice
of closest possible world or belief state should be chosen so that applications of the CRH
result in conclusions consistent with our commonsense causal intuitions.
The combination of CRH and CPH is not circular because—as discussed in the
introduction—the range of descriptions for events that participate in the causal relation is
potentially unbounded: by application of these two hypotheses, we will be able to extend
our causal language to cover a much broader range of types of causal connection. Naturally,
however, the chosen preferences should be as general as possible.
One could also argue that the above list actually represents an argument against
a counterfactually-based theory of causation. However, I believe it simply emphasizes
the point that whichever closeness measure we choose to underly the semantics of
counterfactuals must rely on extra-logical properties; a point that has been emphasized
in such approaches by others [71]. Further, as I have already mentioned, counterfactuals
appear to play a natural role in two areas: (i) dealing with the inherent opacity of causal
reports and (ii) the representation of ancillary causal relations. These are not simply
language problems: I take one of the principal difficulties in developing a commonsense
theory of causation to be that of how to avoid the problem of spurious causation in
explanatory causal reports. This problem is very acute as soon as one takes seriously the
fact that events answer to many descriptions.
2.4. Other belief change operations and approaches to counterfactual reasoning
An alternative means of defining counterfactuality is by way of a branching temporal
logic [17,65,94] where a forward branching structure emerges as a consequence of an
assumption of nondeterminism or free-will on the part of agents being modeled: for
example, some state, s, might represent the root of two branches, α and β , where
each stands for the performance of some distinct action, each of which the agent is
able to perform (i.e., s satisfies each of the actions pre-conditions). It then becomes
straightforward to consider the counterfactual consequences of, say, α instead of β :
one simply follows the alternative path in the tree structure. However, determining the
consequences of not(α) is more problematic when the possibility of concurrent actions is
admitted since many events might be compatible with not(α): some notion of closeness
to what actually occurred is necessary [23, pp. 40–44]. In addition, when modeling
deterministic machines or complex models of agents whose actions are brought about by
their internal mental state, the branching structure may vanish. This can happen whenever
an event, say α, was itself caused by some previous event: one cannot then simply
hypothesize the nonoccurrence of α as that would result in an inconsistency with the
past. A branching structure does emerge, however, as soon as one reconciles the possibly
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inconsistent counterfactual supposition with the rest of one’s beliefs. Such a process
requires some form of belief revision. In the remainder of this paper, when I use the phrase
counterfactual reasoning I will be referring to such a process.
An early work in AI that investigated counterfactuals and other conditionals was that
of Isard [42]. Isard developed a program which answered questions regarding the course
of a tic-tac-toe game. Both indicative and subjunctive conditionals could be used to pose
questions. A typical exchange might involve questions of the form (the numbers refer to
locations on the board): If I had taken four when I took five, what would you have done? . . .
Could you have won? The focus of Isard’s work was primarily on issues of tense, aspect,
and modality; in this paper the focus is more on representational issues.
Nebel [70,71] generalized Ginsberg’s idea showing that revision on belief bases could
be viewed as a special case of revision on belief sets. Belief bases are represented
as finite sets of beliefs whereas belief sets are represented as closed sets of beliefs.
The work in model-based belief revision attempted to address a criticism leveled on
Ginsberg’s approach involving its essentially syntactic foundations [97]. Consider, for
example, the case of ramifications: if α makes φ true and ψ is a ramification of φ then
if some action is performed after α that makes φ false, ψ will no longer hold [69].
To deal with such problems, model-based revision schemes were proposed based on
cardinality of differences between models of the counterfactual antecedent and models
of the counterfactual consequent [10].
2.4.1. Belief updating and Gärdenfors’ triviality theorem
Winslett [97] observed that the above sorts of systems of belief revision produced
incorrect results when used to model actions performed in states characterized by
incomplete knowledge. To take her example, suppose there is a room with two objects,
a book and a magazine and let the formula b stand for the fact that the book is on the floor
and m stand for the fact that the magazine is on the floor. Suppose we know that one of
the two, but not both, is on the floor, that is (b ∨m)∧¬(b ∧m). We now instruct a robot
to put the book on the floor thereby modifying our beliefs to include b. If one adopts a
revision approach such as that of Dalal then since the knowledge base is consistent with b,
the new knowledge base will be b ∧¬m so that the magazine will not be on the floor in
the resulting state. But this is incorrect. The best one should be able to conclude is that the
book is on the floor with the location of the magazine left uncertain. Of course, if we are
instead told that b is on the floor then this change in our knowledge is correctly modelled
by belief revision operators [10].
Winslett therefore argued that belief revision was an inappropriate operation to model
changes in belief coming about from physical actions. Revision can be viewed in terms of
closest models of some world description T with some counterfactual supposition, p. In
contrast, she suggested that the addition of p should really represent an update to T , that
is it should represent a change to the real world, say by way of some action. Since each
model of T can be viewed as one possible way the real world might be, updating picks the
closest models of p to each model of T and then takes the union.
Katsuno and Mendelzon [46], following Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson [1],
present eight rationality postulates that any rational change operation should satisfy. These
are generally collectively referred to as the AGM postulates after Alchourrón, Gärdenfors,
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and Makinson. Katsuno and Mendelzon [45,47] examine differences between knowledge
base revision and knowledge base update: they show that update satisfies a distinct set of
rationality postulates. These are generally referred to as the Katsuno–Mendelzon (KM)
postulates.
Gärdenfors [24] examines the application of belief revision to counterfactual reasoning;
a theorem is presented that demonstrates that any language which includes > will not sat-
isfy the rationality postulates for any except trivial logics (this is sometimes referred to as
Gärdenfors’ triviality theorem). Gärdenfors suggests various ways of getting around this
problem, one of which is to define > at the meta-level and not allow the object language
to include counterfactual statements. Grahne [34] points out that updating does not suffer
from this problem. As such, it can be used to encode knowledge bases which include coun-
terfactual axioms, or to evaluate embedded counterfactuals. An alternative approach is that
of Boutilier [6] who takes the AGM theory of revision together with the Ramsey test as
a starting point, and extends the theory to support revision of conditional belief sets. Al-
though he is able to avoid the problem of Gärdenfors’ triviality theorem, whether or not re-
vision is an appropriate change operation (versus update) for counterfactuals remains moot.
2.4.2. The link to reason maintenance
I believe that Kratzer [50,51] and Veltman [93] were the first to argue that counterfactual
reasoning requires some underlying reason maintenance, though they did not use those
terms. In what follows, I will focus on Kratzer’s presentation. To take one of Kratzer’s
examples, consider a scenario in which some animal—which happens to be a zebra—
escapes from a zoo which also contains giraffes and gazelles as well as other zebras. Now
suppose that instead some other animal had escaped. Would it have been another zebra? As
Kratzer observes, an approach such as that of Lewis’ might count similarity to the animal
that actually escaped—the fact that it was a zebra—as relevant in the choice of most similar
possible world, and therefore relevant to the evaluation of the counterfactual under analysis.
Her suggestion is that similarities of fact should carry greater weight than consequences of
our beliefs. To use her terminology, the fact that the animal that escaped was a zebra should
be “lumped” together with the identity of the zebra; in the language of reason maintenance
systems, the fact that a zebra escaped is justified by the fact that a particular zebra escaped
so that if belief in the latter is discarded so should belief in the former.
The need for lumping also arises, as Kratzer points out, in cases of incomplete
information as well as in situations which require that one properly distinguish law-like
generalizations from what I will term, contingent generalizations [51, p. 627]: 7
(4a) Paula is buying a pound of apples.
(4b) The Atlantic ocean is not drying up.
(4c) Paula is buying a pound of apples or the Atlantic Ocean is drying up.
(4d) If Paula was not buying a pound of apples, the Atlantic Ocean would be drying up.
7 See also the “green cheese problem” of [69].
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Assuming consequential closure of one’s beliefs, the fact expressed by (4c) will also be
among one’s beliefs. If matters of fact are treated on an equal par as their consequences
then the truth of the counterfactual in (4d) will incorrectly follow. In this case, Kratzer
rightly observes that the belief in the disjunction should be lumped with the fact that Paula
is buying apples: once the latter is discarded so will anything lumped together with it.
Example (4c) is, then, a contingent generalization.
Kratzer [50] presents a theory of counterfactuals that addresses these points. Lewis [54]
examines his approach given those requirements identified by Kratzer.
2.5. Which change operation?
The above discussion suggests that some syntactic form of updating should ground
the semantics of counterfactuals, as applied to problems in causal reasoning. Approaches
that have defined update in terms of changes to a belief base which has been converted
to disjunctive normal form do not maintain a distinction between causal knowledge and
noncausal [14,40]; hence, these represent inappropriate methods for this application. What
is needed is a syntactic version of updating in which the form of causal rules is preserved.
Further, applications of updating to counterfactual reasoning have not been integrated with
solutions to the frame problem [34]. An alternative to the approach presented here is one
based on explicit maintenance of justification information [30,85].
3. Hypothetical logic (HL)
This section presents a sorted modal logic which I will callHL for hypothetical logic. It
differs from the language presented in the introduction only in that it is multi-dimensional:
each formula, φ, is interpreted relative to some possible world, w, written w |= φ.
3.1. Syntax ofHL
Definition 3.1. The alphabet for the language consists of:
(1) A set of constants C = Ct ∪ Cd ∪ Cτ , where Ct is a set of event-type constants, Cd
is a set of object constants, and Cτ is a set of time constants (integers). Ct includes
ε, for the null event;
(2) A set, V = Vt ∪ Vd ∪ Vτ ∪ VFluents, of variables, one for each sort in C and VFluents
standing for fluents (see below);
(3) Two binary predicates: holds ranging over fluents and times and occurs ranging over
action terms and times;
(4) A set, F = Ft ∪Fd ∪Fluents, of functions on Ct , Cd , and Cd , respectively, together
with an event-type constructor @ ∈ Ft ;
(5) Quantification, ∀;
(6) Logical connectives {¬,⊃};
(7) One modality, 2W , and a counterfactual connective,>.
The truth of a formula will be given relative to some world. In HL, time is reified
and discrete; that is, time ranges over the integers. To report that φ held at time t
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(relative to the current world), we write: holds(φ, t) and to report that act-type α occurred
at time t , we write occurs(α, t), again relative to the current world. The duration of
an event will be specified in the description of that event by way of an event-type
constructor which creates arbitrarily complex event types from simpler ones: for example,
pickup@agt(Joe)@manner(slowly)@dur(10) might name the event type of some agent,
Joe, picking up an object slowly, that event having taken 10 time units. In this way,
modifier-dropping inferences—such as the fact that pickup@manner(slowly) also occurred
(a slow pickup action)—can be handled through the inclusion of axioms that specify that a
sub-type of an event that occurred also occurred. 8 The formula 2Wφ will mean that φ is
true in all possible worlds (at the given time). Finally, the connective> is the usual one for
counterfactual dependence: φ >ψ is meant to express the fact that if φ had been (instead)
true, then so would have ψ . 9
Definition 3.2. The set of nonact terms is the smallest set, T :
(1) if t ∈ Cd ∪Cτ ∪ Vd ∪ Vτ then t ∈ T ; and
(2) if t1, . . . , tn ∈ T and f ∈ Fd ∪ Fluents, with arity n, then f (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ T .
Definition 3.3. The set of act-type terms is the smallest set, A, such that:
(1) if e ∈ Ct ∪ Vt then e ∈A; and
(2) if e ∈A and f ∈ Fd,x ∈ T then e@f (x) ∈A.
An event type will be taken to be coextensive with the set of intervals in which it occurs.
Definition 3.4. The set of terms, TERMS, is T ∪A.
Definition 3.5. The set of formulas is the smallest set, FORMS, such that:
(1) if x ∈ Fluents and t ∈ Cτ then holds(x, t) ∈ FORMS;
(2) if α ∈A and t ∈Cτ then occurs(α, t) ∈ FORMS;
(3) if p,q ∈ FORMS then so are p⊃ q and ¬p;
(4) if v ∈ V and φ ∈ FORMS, then ∀v.φ ∈ FORMS;
(5) if φ ∈ FORMS then 2Wφ ∈ FORMS;
(6) if φ,ψ ∈ FORMS then so is φ >ψ .
I will refer to the subset of FORMS consisting of holds(p, t) and occurs(α, t) statements,
possibly negated once, with p and α ground terms as ground atoms. The usual additional
logical connectives (∧,∨,≡) are introduced by definition, as is the existential quantifier:
∃x.φ def= ¬∀x.¬φ.
8 See the end of this section. The representation is similar to that of McDermott [65] and also that of Cohen and
Levesque [9] in which propositional fluents are true at a point and events occur over intervals, with the difference
that the duration or interval information is taken to be part of the event description in HL.
9 In my dissertation I explored a related language in which the time element was not reified and statements
referring to the occurrence of an event, α, occurring in world w and at time t were written w, t |= ©α. I have
selected the somewhat more reified form in this paper because it is more generally recognizable.
C.L. Ortiz Jr. / Artificial Intelligence 108 (1999) 125–178 141
3.2. Semantics ofHL
The semantics for HL is given in terms of Kripke structures [8,35]. A model, M,
is defined as a structure, 〈D,W,T ,vw,Ai, I, v〉. D = {Dd,Agt} represents a domain
of individuals common to each possible world, consisting of physical objects, Dd , and
agents, Agt. Formulas in the language are interpreted relative to some model, world,
and time, where W is a set of possible worlds, and T a set of times, here taken from
the set of integers; that is, models are restricted to discrete time. Associated with each
possible world and each agent, i , is a set of formulas or assumptions, A, such that
A : Agt × W × T → FORMS. Worlds are ordered according to a partial ordering, vw;
this ordering reflects relative similarities between possible worlds determined by the set of
assumptions,A, and is discussed in the next section. Formulas and terms are interpreted by
way of an interpretation function, I , and a variable valuation, v : V →D. The semantics
for the counterfactual connective will be given in Section 5 in terms of the notion of
information state.
In this language, the interpretation of an event type will be the set of world-time intervals
over which it occurs. It is therefore useful to be able to refer to arbitrary spans of time
within a world.
Definition 3.6. Let the set of world-time intervals, T , be defined as:
T = {〈w, tj , . . . , tn〉 |w ∈W, ti ∈ T , for j 6 i 6 n, such that ti+1 = ti + 1}.
If an event has duration of one time unit and occurs in world w and time t , then this
means that it will occur over the interval 〈w, t, t + 1〉. If an event occurs at time t in
world w and has no duration then it occurs over the interval 〈w, t〉. Examples of events
with zero duration include the distinguished null event as well as test events. Point events
representing occurrences such as “the ball reached its highest point (after being thrown
in the air)” can be modeled instead as actions testing the truth of “highest point”. The
representation is neutral, however, with respect to many important ontological questions
involving time points [39].
Definition 3.7. Let I = (Id , It , Iτ , If , Ip). Then the interpretation of terms is given by:
(1) Id :Cd→Dd ;
(2) It :A→ T ;
(3) Iτ :Cτ → T ;
(4) If : (F − Fluents)→ (W × T → (Dn→D)); and,
(5) Ip : Fluents×Dn→ 2W×T .
Definition 3.8. The denotation of a term, s, relative to some model, M, world, w, and
time, t , written as [[s]]wt (where reference toM is suppressed when understood):
(1) if c ∈ Cd,Ct , or Cτ then [[c]]wt is either Id(c), It (c), or Iτ (c), respectively;
(2) if u ∈ V then [[u]]wt = v(u);
(3) [[f (r)]]wt = If (f )(w, t)[[r]]wt .
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Let φ[x/d] stand for the substitution instance of d for x in φ.
Definition 3.9. A formula φ is satisfiable in M at w, written M,w |= φ, just in case it is
subsumed by one of the following cases:
(1) if p ∈ Fluents, of arity n, then M,w |= holds(p(t1, . . . , tn), t) iff 〈w, t〉 ∈
Ip(p)([[t1]]wt , . . . , [[tn]]wt );
(2) if α ∈ A then M,w |= occurs(α, t) iff ∃γ = 〈w, t, t + 1, . . . , t + n〉 such that,
γ ∈ [[α]]wt ;
(3) if φ,ψ ∈ FORMS, then M,w |= φ ⊃ψ iff either M,w |=ψ or M,w 6|= φ;
(4) if φ,ψ ∈ FORMS, then M,w |= ¬φ iff M,w 6|= φ;
(5) M,w |= ∀x.Φ(φ, t) iff for all d ∈ D: 〈w, t〉 ∈ Ip(φ[x/d]), where Φ ∈ {holds,
occurs};
(6) M,w |=2Wφ iff for all w′: M,w′ |= φ.
If φ is satisfiable in all models (i.e., valid), we write |= φ. Here is an example of a
formula in the language: 10
w |= holds(on(A,B),T )∧ occurs(put@agt(Harry)@obj(C)@on(A)@dur(5), T )
This reports that in world w, time T , block A was on block B and Harry carried out the
action having duration 5 of putting block C on A.
In HL, possible worlds are viewed as alternative possibilities from the point of view
of the language used to describe worlds—that is, maximally consistent sets of formulas
[52]. This is in contrast to the realist position of Lewis [53]. In the above, the domain,
D, is common to all possible worlds. This raises the usual question of how to deal with
statements involving individuals that might not exist in some worlds [23]. I will assume an
existence predicate, E (actually, a term in this reified language), If (E) : D→ 2W×T . In
this way, every formula receives a truth value. The following axiom relates the existence
predicate to domain closure axioms:
∀x.holds(E(x), t)≡ ∃y.holds(y = x, t) (17)
Definition 3.10 (Dynamic logic connectives). The following are meta-theoretic defini-
tions of some common dynamic logic connectives for, respectively, test actions and se-
quencing, where dur(α, d) is true if d is the duration of α and φ ∈ Fluents.
|= occurs(φ?, t) def≡ holds(φ, t) (test action)
|= occurs(α;β, t) def≡
holds(dur(α, d), t)∧ occurs(α, t) ∧ occurs(β, t + d) (sequence)
Definition 3.11 (Miscellaneous axioms). The following are some useful definitions.
(1) |= holds(sub−type(m,m)∧ (sub−type(m@t1,m@t2)⊂ sub−type(t1, t2)), t)
(subtype)
10 In the remainder of this paper, upper case symbols will stand for constants and lower case for variables. In
addition, formulas will be assumed to be universally quantified.
C.L. Ortiz Jr. / Artificial Intelligence 108 (1999) 125–178 143
(1) |= holds(event−type(α@m)≡ name(α)∧mods(m), t)
(2) |= holds(mods(Λ), t), the empty modifier
(3) |= ∀atom(u)∀mods(m).holds(mods(u@m), t), groups of modifiers
(4) |= ∀atom(u)¬holds(in(u,Λ), t)
(5) |= ∀atom(u)∀atom(v)∀mods(m).holds(in(u, (v@x))≡ u= v ∨ in(u, x), t),
membership
(6) |= ∀atom(u)∀mods(x).holds(u@(u@x)= u@x, t), irrelevance of copies
(7) |= ∀atom(u)∀atom(v)∀mods(x).holds(u@(v@x)= v@(u@x), t),
order irrelevance
(8) |= ∀mods(y).holds(sub−type(Λ,y), t), sub-modifiers
(9) |= ∀atom(u)∀mods(x)∀mods(y).
holds(sub−type(u@x,y)≡ (in(u, y)∧ sub−type(x, y)), t)
Fig. 3. Axiomatization of the @ event-type constructor.
(2) |= holds(part−of (α,β), t)≡ event(α)∧ event(β)∧ ∃δ∃γ.β = (γ ;α; δ) (part-of)
(3) |= holds(f (α@T ,x), t) def≡ T = α@y@f (x)@z (extraction)
(4) |= occurs(ε@dur(0), t) (null event)
Axiom (3) extracts some property from an action description. For example,
holds(manner(α@agt(i)@dur(4)@manner(slow)@obj(x), slow), t)
In addition, I will make use of the common meta-theoretic definitions: holds(φ, t) ∧
holds(ψ, t) just in case holds(φ ∧ ψ, t), etc. 11 Although these conventions are by no
means uniformly upheld, they will become necessary in the representation of nomic
expressions.
Fig. 3 axiomatizes the @ event-type constructor using relativized quantifiers. The @-
constructor essentially constructs a set consisting of an event type, α, and a set of modifiers,
x1, x2, . . . , xn, separated by @. The language used consists of Λ, the empty collection of
modifiers; atom(x), denoting the atom relation true if x is a single element; mods(x),
a predicate true if x is nonatomic, that is, is some set of modifiers α@x1@x2@ · · ·@xn;
in(x, y), denoting the membership relation; and a predicate sub−type(x, y). A set of names
of event types is distinguished by way of the name predicate; more complex descriptions
of event types are formed by appending modifiers using the @ function. Terms such as
α@Λ are written simply as α. Axiom (6) from the figure allows one to conclude that the
following are equivalent:
pickup@agt(John)@obj(Block)@agt(John)= pickup@agt(John)@obj(Block)
11 Actually, the logical operators that occur inside of the holds statements are really functions. However, I will
simply use the same symbol for both.
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3.3. Some remarks on ontology
Consider the following counterfactual framed relative to some reference to a particular
event; in this case, an explosion that destroyed a building.
(5) If that explosion had not occurred then the building would not have been destroyed.
It turns out that the truth of such a counterfactual depends crucially on the choice of event
ontology. Consider one well-respected theory of events, due to Davidson [12,13], in which
events are first class citizens: the logical form of reports involving reference to events are
captured by statements involving quantifiers that range over such particulars. Under this
view, events answer to a number of descriptions which are captured by predications over
tokens. Analogous to our commonsense individuation of physical objects, we could say
that two events are equal just in case all of their properties line up.
The difficulty with (5) then becomes the following: one can always dig up a property,
however, aberrant, shared by one particular (the hypothetical event) not shared by
another (the actual event that occurred). For example, in considering the counterfactual
consequences of the explosion not occurring one might choose the closest possible world
in terms of one in which an explosion did occur but which differed ever so slightly from
the actual one, say, in terms of the duration. In such alternative worlds, the building would
be destroyed nonetheless. Lewis, in his analysis of counterfactuals, was of course keenly
aware of this difficulty. Having framed his theory of causation in terms of counterfactuals
involving event particulars, he was forced to search for ways to circumvent this difficulty;
his subsequent paper on events served this purpose [58]. In it he suggested that examples
such as the one above involve separating what he termed the essential from the inessential
properties of events so that, for example, the precise duration of the explosion might not
fall among those properties essential to the explosion. Lewis presents a number of general
criteria which are meant to aid in isolating an event’s essential properties. Yagisawa [90]
extends these ideas further.
These problems, of course, have not come up in contemporary treatments of counter-
factuals in AI. The reason is that in AI events are usually represented atomically (for ex-
ample, shoot, die, pickup, putdown) as state pairs consisting of a set of pre-
conditions for the performance of the action and post-conditions that represent the action’s
effects [18]. There is usually no way to form more complex descriptions of events, other
than by operations such as composition. 12 In addition, many events cannot be represented
merely as pairs of descriptions representing the external state of the world simply because
some events involve no observable movement or change; e.g., “I held the cup steady”. In
computational linguistics more sophisticated representations of events have been explored
[82–84,95], though not in the context of the systems of counterfactual reasoning that are
the focus of the present work.
The problem of event individuation remains, nevertheless, an extremely difficult one.
In particular, since there is no general agreement on a solution, it is worth exploring
alternatives to Lewis’ suggestion. Bennett [5, p. 58] notes, for example, that counterfactuals
12 Dynamic logic, for example, supplies a number of operators with which to compose sequences of actions
from basic ones.
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involving events are very rare in natural language: it is unlikely that one would ever have
the occasion to utter the counterfactual (5); it is more likely that one would say, “if there
had not been an explosion the building would not have been destroyed”. For our purposes,
then, I will simply assume that counterfactuals, as applied to causal reasoning, refer to facts
about the occurrence of events.
4. Explanatory update theory (EUT)
This section presents a hybrid approach to reasoning about action—Explanatory Update
Theory (EUT)—which borrows and extends the notion of a “motivated” action developed
in motivated action theory (MAT) [86] with principles of minimal information change.
Central to reasoning about action is a satisfactory treatment of the frame problem [21].
The nonmonotonic approaches to the frame problem can be divided into the chronological
and causal. The former incorporate a temporal preference that delays change as long
as possible [48,80], whereas the latter incorporate some underlying notion of causality
[2,60,86]. Morgenstern [68] discusses typical problems with existing solutions:
(1) some are formulated within an overly restrictive temporal representation (e.g., the
work of Baker [2] is expressed within the situation calculus);
(2) some are not compatible with solutions to other reasoning problems (e.g., the work
of Shoham [80] cannot handle both prediction and explanation); and
(3) some require too many frame axioms or persistence rules (e.g., motivated action
theory (MAT) [67,86]).
More recent work has focussed on specialized action languages or approaches based on
logic programming paradigms [3,26,31]. For example, rather than begin with a general
logical language, such as the one described in this paper, Baral et al. [3] consider a
simple action and explore the minimal demands that commonsense reasoning about
action might impose. The work of Shanahan [79] has instead been grounded in the event
calculus, extended to handle such things as continuous change; however, explanation is
not addressed directly as in MAT. Finally, recent work on specialized causal languages
[62] do not address the problem of connecting causal laws to particulars: the notion of
“cause” introduced there does not correspond to the notion that appears in commonsense
explanations, it is introduced to handle technical problems having to do with atemporal
ramifications. EUT combines ideas from the theory of information change with features
of MAT: its causal preference, its ability to handle both prediction and explanation, and a
representation that can handle concurrent actions.
Before discussing how EUT differs from MAT, I will first present a brief overview of the
latter. A scenario in MAT is described by some theory, T , of facts about the world together
with causal rules of the form α ∧ φ ⊃ γ , where α describes the occurrence of some act in
the world, φ some fact about the state of the world, and γ a description of an action or a
fact resulting from the performance of α. Some action, γ , is then said to be motivated with
respect to T just in case it either holds in all models of T or there is some causal rule (or
chain of rules) in which α is motivated and φ is true in the model. One then minimizes the
set of unmotivated act tokens.
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In MAT persistence rules are used to infer the nonoccurrence of events. For example,
in the Yale Shooting Problem (YSP) 13 [36] a typical persistence rule might be: “If a gun
is loaded at time t and neither an unload nor a shoot occur, then the gun is loaded at
t + 1”. One way around this difficulty is to manually derive persistence rules from the set
of causal rules: in the YSP, by listing the ways in which a gun could become unloaded.
This assumes, however, that every observed event is explainable. Stein and Morgenstern
favor instead a nonmonotonic approach in which persistence rules are derived by way of
some closed world assumption. This addresses the representational problem but not the
computational one of determining all of the possible ways in which some state change
could be prevented.
MAT also has problems with explanation in the context of incompletely specified causal
chains. Consider the following task involving a row of 100 dominos in which the only
information given is that at time 1 all of the dominos are up and at time 100 the last domino
falls. MAT prefers models in which any ith domino falls (where i 6 100) causing all of the
dominos from i to 100 to fall one after another. However, since all of these falling events
are unmotivated, none of the above models is preferred to one in which all of the dominos
from i to 100 fall at the same time! 14
Less serious problems include: an unnecessary restriction to prefer the least number
of unmotivated actions and not, more generally, facts; as well as the inability to deal
with event ramifications: since ramifications of unmotivated actions are unmotivated
by definition, they may incorrectly factor into the computation of preferred models. In
contrast, EUT minimizes the number of facts which lack support from some body of
causal knowledge: in the dominos example this will mean that only the one falling event
which triggers all the rest will be unmotivated. The next two sections describe how an
agent’s information state (symbolized, σ ) is formed by updating each state with the
information from the previous state, allowing any of these inertial inferences to be defeated
by other (possibly unexplainable) given information. In this way, persistence rules are
eliminated.
4.1. Information change operations
The information change operations to follow were motivated by the problems involving
the evaluation of counterfactuals discussed earlier. With these in mind, I have adopted
Kratzer’s suggestion involving a similarity measure in which the choice of closest worlds
is biased by some set of assumptions. I therefore begin by associating a set of assumptions,
Ai(w, t)=Li (w, t) ∪WDi (w, t), with each world state, 〈w, t〉, and agent, i . 15 The only
assumption made regarding A is that it represents a satisfiable belief base. In the present
setting, working with a belief base is preferable since the syntactic form of formulas in A
will play a role in the evolution of the agent’s beliefs and also in determining the degree of
13 For details, see the benchmarks section in this paper.
14 Since MAT minimizes act tokens, this model is equally preferable to one in which domino 100 magically falls
and rises 100 times (the falling events occur at different times and, hence, represent distinct tokens).
15 Occasionally, I will suppress the subscript and the references to the world and time when their identity is clear
from the context.
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support for some conclusion. Recall that the latter feature derives from an implicit “reason
maintenance”: in revising a belief base, A, with some φ any revision of A must include
as much of A consistent with φ. For example, if A= {φ,φ ⊃ ψ} then A |= ψ but if A is
revised with ¬φ, ψ will no longer hold. In contrast, revision operations based on belief
sets usually perform the minimal change—with respect to some minimality criteria—to
models of A consistent with φ and so ψ would hold in the revised belief set. As Nebel [70]
has shown, however, revision operations on belief bases can be viewed as equivalent to
revisions on belief sets in which a certain subset of the belief set is taken as “foundational”,
other beliefs will be assumed to be derived. As we shall see, this is accomplished by
imposing an ordering on the closure of the set of formulas in the language.
Among an agent’s assumption set is a body of laws consisting of nomic expressions,
ramification rules, and explanatory knowledge. These are written in the following form.
Definition 4.1 (Laws). Laws in Li(w, t) will be expressed in the form:
occurs(β, t)∧ occurs(α, t)⊃Ψt ′
where β can be a test action, φ?, t ′ > t and where Ψt ′ is either a single effect, holds(ψ, t ′),
a disjunction: holds(ψ1, t ′) ∨ holds(ψ2, t ′), . . . , or similarly an occurs statement or
disjunction of occurs statements. Such laws specify the effect, Ψ , of event type α given
the circumstances, φ, in which it is performed. It is assumed that any conjunctive effect be
represented by two causal rules with identical left-hand sides.
The latter condition is imposed because iterated revisions of a belief base can lead to
undesirable results if the triggering of a causal rule results in some conjunction, say φ∧ψ ,
which is then added to an agent’s beliefs; subsequent retraction of either φ or ψ would then
result in both the removal of φ and ψ , which would be incorrect from the point of view
of the application of interest to this thesis. For the same reasons, I will also assume that
an agent’s assumptions will always be in a conjunctive-free form: that is, φ,ψ ∈A instead
of φ ∧ ψ ∈ A. Notice also that it is possible for t ′ = t in the definition: this will permit
analysis of cases of simultaneous causation.
Ramification rules are of the same form as causal rules except the time point of the
right-hand side is the same as that of the left-hand side. Explanatory rules differ in two
ways. First, they are generally expressed as implications in the direction opposite to that
of their causal counterparts. An example is, “the fact that the grass is wet means that it has
rained”. Secondly, they are distinguished by their use. This is discussed later in the context
of counterfactual reasoning. I will refer to the subset of explanatory rules as LE .
Let  represent a complete preorder with maximal elements over a set of beliefs, T ;
such an ordering is referred to as an epistemic relevance ordering by Nebel [71]. The
equivalence relation induced is defined as φ 'ψ iff φ ψ and ψ  φ. The corresponding
equivalence classes are denoted χ and referred to by Nebel as degrees of epistemic
relevance, where the set of equivalence classes T/ ' is denoted by T = T1, . . . , Tn with
T1 representing the degree of highest relevance. I will also write S  T where S and T
represent sets of formulas just in case for every s ∈ S and t ∈ T we have that s  t . Let
Cn stand for logical closure. Then, a deductively closed belief set, K , will be given by
K = Cn(K). Finally, let K ⊥ φ stand for the set of subsets of K that do not imply φ.
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There are a number of basic constraints that should be imposed on .
Preference 4.1 (Laws are most firmly entrenched). Laws are more firmly entrenched than
facts from the world description:
WDi(w, t) ≺Li(w, t)
The inclusion of an existence predicate into our language suggests the following
preference.
Preference 4.2 (Preference to existence of known objects).
WDi(w, t)− {E(x) |E(x) ∈WDi (w, t)} ≺ {E(x) | E(x) ∈WDi(w, t)}
≺Li (w, t)
That is, the set of E(x) statements are given priority over the rest of the statements in
WD. The reason for this constraint should be clear: without it, the closest worlds in which
the left-hand side of a counterfactual hold might be ones in which (trivially) some object
simply does not exist and therefore any action with which it was involved—in the actual
world—might not hold in the counterfactual worlds.
The central result of Nebel’s of interest here is the correspondence demonstrated
between prioritized revision on belief bases and revision over belief sets generated by an
epistemic relevance ordering. Nebel [71] demonstrates this correspondence by way of the
following.
Definition 4.2 (Maximally preferred belief sets). LetA stand for a strict partial ordering
on A,B ∈ 2K , where K is a belief set, and A is the set of equivalence classes over the set
of assumptionsA generated by . Then,
AA B iff
∃τ : ((A∩ τ ⊂B ∩ τ) and ∀ω τ : (A∩ω=B ∩ω))
Since some set of assumptions are chosen to represent a set of beliefs that are somehow
more “interesting” or foundational, ordered by , we have that one subset of the belief
set is then preferred just in case it contains more formulas from each equivalence class of
assumptions.
The  ordering can then be used to construct a selection function [24] that selects
maximally preferred elements of some belief set, K , that do not imply φ (written:K ⊥ φ):
γ(K ⊥ φ) def= {L ∈ (K ⊥ φ) | ∀M ∈ (K ⊥ φ): L 6M}
The contraction ofK by φ, writtenK ∼ φ (i.e., the removal of φ fromK) can be defined
by:
K ∼ φ =
⋂
γ(Cn(K)⊥φ)
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Notice that any belief set is also a belief base and so we can use the above definition for
both. Such a contraction is called a partial meet contraction function in the literature.
Let a disjunctive rule be simply a rule in causal form in which the consequent consists
of a disjunction of formulas. The notion of support for a belief relative to some theory can
then be defined as follows (based on an idea of Hansson [37]):
Definition 4.3 (Supported beliefs). Let T =WD ∪ L be a belief base in which T |= ψ
and let R be a disjunctive rule in L, such that L is protected.
supported(T ,ψ) iff
(i) φ ∈ T but φ /∈ T ∼ψ
and ∃T ′.T ∼ψ ⊆ T ′ ⊆ T
and ψ /∈Cn(T ′) but ψ ∈Cn(T ′ ∪ {φ})
(ii) or ψ ∈ T and ∃R ∈ T .ψ /∈ T ∼R
That is, ψ is supported just in case there is some φ ∈ T such that φ disappears from each
element of T ∼ ψ . Disjunction presents special problems. The first clause above handles
support for exclusive-or disjunction: if p ∨ q,p,¬q ∈ T then p is supported. The latter
case is needed, however, to handle inclusive-or: if φ∨ψ,φ,ψ ∈ T then φ,ψ are supported
by virtue of the presence of the disjunction. Similarly, for causal rules expressing the effects
of nondeterministic actions in terms of rules of the form occurs(α, t) ⊃ holds(ψ ∨ φ, t ′).
In this definition it is assumed that whateverWD ∈ T is in proper form so that supported
formulas are not inWD to begin with. That is, if φ,φ ⊃ψ ∈WD then ψ /∈WD.
Nebel shows that revisions generated by 6 satisfy all of the revision postulates—that
is, 6 is transitive—just in case the relevance ordering satisfies the following
(1) if φ `ψ then φ ψ , and
(2) for any φ,ψ: φ  (φ ∧ψ) or ψ  (φ ∧ψ).
With this machinery, we now have a notion of revision on belief sets relative to some set of
foundational beliefs. Such an operation, will play a central role in EUT’s definition of belief
update. Unlike base revision—in which one could have {p,p ⊃ q,q} ∼ p |= q instead of
having q depend on p— now, if we stipulate that the set of {p,p ⊃ q} is foundational, we
will get the desired dependency.
4.2. Causal dependencies and inertia
EUT is based on the following extension of MAT’s idea of a motivated action. In order
to distinguish EUT’s notion from MAT’s, I will instead use the phrase supported action in
place of motivated action.
In EUT, rather than require persistence rules, we instantiate the following copy rule
schema for every ground atom. This schema simply states that any fact that was true at
one time instant is true at the next time instant. Instances of this rule are then given lowest
priority relative to the  ordering and, hence, will be discarded as soon as they conflict
with any known or inferred information.
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Definition 4.4 (Copy statements). Let the set P (i.e., the set of persistence) stand for every
instance of the following “copy” rule.
holds(φ, t)⊃ holds(φ, t + 1)
for all t , where φ is a ground term, possibly negated.
Preference 4.3. We have
P ≺WD≺L
That is, persistence assumptions have least priority whereas law-like knowledge has
greatest.
In addition, it will be useful to define the following event type, signalling a change in
the truth of a fluent.
Definition 4.5 (Event type for fluent change). Let the set Ch stand for every instance of
the following:
occurs(change(φ), t)≡ holds(φ, t)∧ holds(¬φ, t + 1)
for all t , where φ is a ground term.
We are going to minimize the set of unsupported positive ground atoms; the above will
allow us to minimize arbitrary change as well.
Let A stand for some theory in HL consisting, as usual, of a world description, WD,
and a set of laws, L. Let
‖φ‖ = {w ∈W |w |= φ}
and define Γ (u) for each possible world, u, as the maximally consistent (and therefore
complete) set of formulas true in u (therefore, u = v iff Γ (u) = Γ (v)). In the
axiomatizations that follow unique names assumptions and domain closure axioms will
be included: this means that possible worlds can be simply identified with a Herbrand
base of the interpretation (set of ground atoms with the set of ground terms appearing in
the language). Let Herb(T ) be the Herbrand Base for maximally consistent set T over
both positive and negative atoms corresponding to the interpretation of T . Given some
u ∈ ‖A∪Ch‖, let
Φ(u)=Herb(Γ (u))∪L∪ (P ∩Γ (u))
Φ(u) includes ground atoms together with persistences laws. What we would like to do
now is have some way of constructing a set, Γ ∗(u), which contains onlyL and unsupported
formulas, where everything else in Γ (u) could be derived. There is no general way of doing
this particularly since we are admitting the possibility of explanatory rules which can lead
to circular support (we might have a causal rule of the form φ ⊃ψ and an explanatory rule
of ψ ⊃ φ, both of which happen to fire). To get around this, two things are done: first an
initial set of foundational beliefs are identified which are always retained: this is one way
in which the syntactic form of the assumption set plays a role in EUT. Unfortunately, this
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is not enough: some pair of formulas φ and ψ might later be assumed but not represent
part of the foundational set and might be mutually supported by way of nomic expressions
and explanatory rules. For example, if we have nomic expressions p ⊃ q , q ⊃ r and an
explanatory rule r ⊃ p, together with the set of assumptions {p,q}, then each of {p,q} is
supported and, since neither is an assumption, both would be deleted from Γ ∗(u). Instead,
we proceed as follows. For any possible world, u, let premises(u) be the set of foundational
beliefs. Let Supp(u)= {φ | supported(Φ(u),φ)}. Now, define
φ ∈ Ψ (u) iff
φ ∈ premises(u), or
φ ∈Φ(u) and φ /∈ Supp(u)
We can now say that,
Definition 4.6 (Standard form for possible worlds). Given someLE ⊆L, Ψ (u) as defined
above and Res(u) (see below), we have
φ ∈ Γ ∗(u) iff
φ ∈ Ψ (u), or
φ ∈ Γ (u) and Ψ (u) 6|= φ and φ ∈ Res(u), or
∃R ∈LE.(Φ(u)− {φ,R}) 6|= φ
That is, φ ∈ Γ ∗(u) just in case φ either represents a foundational belief, φ is in Φ(u)
but is not supported, φ is a nonpremise which is in Γ (u) and Res(u) (see below) but does
not follow from Ψ (u) alone, for the reasons mentioned above, or φ represents a conclusion
that follows from an explanatory rule. The first clause addresses one problem with circular
support by making sure that foundational formulas are always retained. That is, if we have
a belief base consisting of causal rules p ⊃ q and q ⊃ r together with the beliefs {p,q, r},
premise p, and the explanatory rule q ⊃ p, then q and r are both supported and hence
not included in Γ ∗ but p is since it is a premise. The last clause handles certain problems
having to do with the persistence of derived information [69]. In EUT, all conclusions are
assumed to persist by default. For example, if we have an explanatory rule that says that if
something is on a table then it is liftable:
holds(ontable(x), t)⊃ holds(liftable(x), t)
together with the fact that x is on the table, then both ontable and liftable will persist, by
default. In contrast, conclusions that follow from either nomic expressions or ramification
rules such as:
holds(ontable(x), t)⊃ holds(safefrombaby(x), t)
where the latter does not necessarily persist if the object is moved from the table, require
that the knowledge base also contain rules which specify the circumstances under which
an object is no longer safe from the baby. Additional cases such as adding the axiom:
holds(empty(x), t)⊃ holds(liftable(x), t)
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(where x stands for a container) can be defeated by some later causal rule that describes the
filling of the container, under the present scheme. This scheme will not, however, produce
intuitive conclusions when we deal with counterfactuals. The reason is that if we retract the
formula holds(ontable(x), t) above then holds(liftable(x), t ′) for some time t ′ in the future
will also be retracted when intuitively it should persist. Instead, we partition the set of rules
in L into ramification rules whose conclusions, such as holds(safefrombaby(x), t), can
intuitively be retracted, with explanatory rules whose conclusions are, in a sense, timeless:
for example, the formula holds(liftable(x), t). The last clause therefore checks whether φ
is a consequence of some explanatory rule. If it is, then φ itself is included in Γ ∗.
The second clause handles the problematic case for pairs of formulas that are mutually
supported but are not premises. Since one of them must be retained and since the basis on
which we do so is beyond the scope of this paper—indeed, none of the examples examined
will depend on this clause—I will simply assume that the formulas in our language can be
totally ordered by some ordering<which will be used to pick the most “relevant” formulas
to keep in Γ ∗(u). 16 This ordering might reflect some recipe we have for picking elements
to retain.
Definition 4.7 (Residue). Res(w) ⊆ Γ (w) where Ψ (w) ⊆ Res(w) and φ ∈ Γ (w) iff
Res(w) |= φ. In addition, ∀L ⊂ Res(w).∃x ∈ Γ (w) such that L 6|= x and ∀y ∈ Res(w) −
Ψ (w) and ∀z ∈ Γ (w)−Res(w) we have that z < y (i.e., y is more relevant than z). Clearly,
φ ∈ Γ (w) iff Γ ∗(w) |= φ.
Given a set of assumptions, A(w, t), I will assume, without loss of generality, thatWD
is in disjunctive normal form (DNF). This is so we can extract the relevant elements of
WD relative to the world being updated.
Definition 4.8 (Foundational set). Let WD(w, t) = {C1,C2, . . . ,Cn} represent a set of
clauses which compriseWD. Then, let the foundational set of assumptions be,
foundations(WD)=
{
C | i ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, j = {1, . . . , n} − i such that
C =
(((∧
i
Ci
)
∧
(∧
j
¬Cj
))
& C ∧L
)
is satisfiable
}
The foundational set relative to some world w′ ∈ ‖WD ∪L‖, written premises(w′), is the
s ∈ foundations(WD) such that w′ |= s.
Notice that L—i.e., law-like knowledge—is never put in DNF as then the syntactic
form of laws would vanish. The idea is that when computing the update or information
state, we pick the element of the foundational set which holds in the particular world we
are updating: that foundational set is then ordered as usual by way of .
16 This ordering is not the same as the  ordering.
C.L. Ortiz Jr. / Artificial Intelligence 108 (1999) 125–178 153
We can now define the notion of epistemic support, analogous to the notion of motivation
in MAT.
Definition 4.9 (Epistemic support). Define a partial order, E , as follows. Given some
satisfiable set of assumptions, Ai(w, t), there are two major types of support:
• Foundational support. φ is foundationally supported just in case ‖Ai(w, t)‖ ⊆ ‖φ‖.
That is, just in case φ is true in any world in which A(w, t) is true. Notice that φ can
refer to the occurrence of an action.
• Nomic support. φ is nomically supported with respect to some w′ ∈ ‖A(w, t)‖, just
in case supported(Γ ∗(w′),φ).
A statement, φ, is epistemically supported in w′ ∈ ‖A(w, t)‖ just in case it is either
foundationally or nomically supported with respect to w′. An action is unsupported with
respect to w′ just in case it is not epistemically supported with respect to w′. Let
unsup
(
w′
)= {φ ∈ Γ ∗(w′) | φ = occurs(change(ψ), t) and
holds(¬ψ, t + 1)) is not epistemically supported or,
φ = occurs(α, s),φ is not epistemically supported and
if α is a test action, ψ?, then
ψ is a positive ground atom
}
The explanatory ordering, E , is then defined as follows. We say that u E v for any
u,v ∈ ‖Ai(w, t)‖, iff |unsup(u)| 6 |unsup(v)|; that is, if the cardinality of the set of
unsupported facts in u is less than or equal to the cardinality of the set of unsupported
facts in v. Clearly, E is a partial order.
The idea is that some φ is epistemically supported just in case it is either true in all
possible worlds of ‖A(w, t)‖ or it follows from some law in L. The initial formulation
of MAT focussed on motivated actions because models were chosen that contained a
minimal number of unmotivated actions: that was necessary since persistence rules were
expressed in terms of the nonoccurrence of certain actions; the above formulation avoids
this restriction by adding the event type corresponding to a fluent change, so we can
minimize the set of such unsupported changes. Since Γ ∗ does not include the definition for
this special event type, it will never be supported. This approach also avoids having to hand-
craft persistence rules that state when a fluent will not change given the nonoccurrence of
certain actions. Such rules were necessary in MAT in addition to a general rule of inertia.
Notice also that given the definition of Γ and the fact that in AI we deal with finite domains
the above definition is well defined.
The definition for epistemic support correctly does not include ramifications into
the cardinality computation. In fact, we can consider a ramification as simply a belief
supported by some other belief. This is important since under the present representation
the number of event or fact ramifications can be unbounded. For example, suppose that
some situation is characterized by the fact that hitting a ball with a certain force counts as
a home run and, under the given circumstances, hitting a home run counts as winning the
game. Then each of “hitting a home run” and “winning the game” are higher-level actions
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which are nomically supported by the more basic action. Hence, they will not factor into
the cardinality computation. Fact ramifications are dealt with in a similar manner: if I
am sitting in my office, this entails that I am also inside the Engineering building which
entails that I am currently at the University of Pennsylvania. These two latter facts are
again nomically supported by the more basic fact.
The agent’s information state, written as σ(w, t), is now defined as follows. Let the
notation min(W,E) stand for the set of all worlds w ∈W such that w is minimal in W
with respect to E .
Definition 4.10 (Information state).
σ(w, t)=min{‖WD ∪L‖,E}
I will write σ(w, t) |= φ just in case φ holds in all w′ ∈ σ(w, t).
Since possible worlds are viewed as maximally consistent sets, each Γ (w) will contain
some subset of P . The σ construction is syntactically grounded in the sense that the form
of elements in Γ ∗ plays a strong role in determining epistemic support and whether some
belief set is maximally preferred (that is, maximal with respect to). The latter will play
a role in the definition of update given in the next section.
Given the notion of an information state, the truth of formulas will now be given relative
to some σ .
5. The semantics of counterfactuals
Given the framework just presented, we are now in a position to consider the semantics
of counterfactual implication. Counterfactuals will be evaluated relative to some agent’s
information state. Underlying the proposed definition will be the operation of belief
updating as well as a minimality condition on possible worlds expressed in terms of
support for a belief. The relevance ordering, , and a modified CRH will then be chosen
so that the inferences sanctioned are indeed those consistent with our intuitions involving
commonsense causal dependencies.
Consider now a function that maps each possible world, u, to a partial pre-order, vu,
such that the following condition 17 is satisfied:
For any v ∈W , if u 6= v then u<u v
Definition 5.1 (Information update (Katsuno and Mendelzon)). Let S and T be belief
bases. The update of a set of possible worlds, ‖S‖, with a set, ‖T ‖, of possible worlds,
relative to some partial pre-order,vu, where u ∈ ‖T ‖ is given by:
‖S‖  ‖T ‖ def=
⋃
u∈‖S‖
min
{‖T ‖,vu}
17 Termed, faithful, in [47].
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Recall the idea behind update. To update some theory, S, with some T , we pick the
minimum T -worlds for each possible S world according to the vu ordering.
Definition 5.2 (Similarity ordering). The orderingvu will be defined as:
v vu w iff Γ ∗(v) 6Γ ∗(u) Γ ∗(w)
That is, v is at least as close to u as w just in case w does not contain more foundational
beliefs Γ ∗(u). vu is clearly faithful since u 6= v implies that Γ (u) 6= Γ (v) which implies
that there is some φ ∈ Γ (u) such that φ /∈ Γ (v). This means, by definition of Γ ∗, that
∃ψ ∈ Γ ∗(u) such that, ψ /∈ Γ ∗(v) which implies that Γ ∗(v) Γ ∗(u) Γ ∗(u), and that
Γ ∗(u) 6 Γ ∗(v), or that u <u v. It follows that the construction described here satisfies
the KM postulates [47, Theorem 3.4].
Counterfactual dependencies will be declared between facts about the world—including
facts about the occurrence of events. For example, the counterfactual:
(6) If domino C had not fallen when it did, then dominoD would not have fallen when
it did
will be expressed, relative to speaker i’s information state at time t , as:
σi(w, t) |= ¬occurs( fall@agt(C),3) >¬occurs( fall@agt(D),4)
Preferences on beliefs will reflect the differences discussed earlier between two types
of counterfactuals: predictive counterfactuals which deal with counterfactual inferences
involving the future and explanatory counterfactuals that demand a (past) explanation for
some (present) counterfactual supposition. Before presenting the semantics let me first
formally define these two types of counterfactuals.
Definition 5.3 (Canonical form for counterfactuals). Given a counterfactual in the
following form,
σ(w, t) |= occurs(α, t1) > occurs(β, t2)
a predictive counterfactual is one in which t2 > t1 and an explanatory counterfactual is one
in which t2 < t1. Either α or β can be test actions.
In both cases, t1 will be referred to as the time of the counterfactual.
I will present one semantics for counterfactual implication. However, the preferences
that bear on the two types of counterfactuals will differ. The reason is that explanatory
counterfactuals involve, by definition, some form of explanation and therefore require
that one consider many possibilities involving varying the past. In contrast, predictive
counterfactuals, as we shall see, require holding the past constant. In fact, as we shall
see, predictive and explanatory counterfactuals will differ by their use and hence by the
preferences that bear on their evaluation.
Definition 5.4 (Counterfactual implication). Relative to some information state, σ(w, t),
and the orderings,  and E , we have:
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σ(w, t) |= occurs(α, t1) > occurs(β, t2) iff
min{σ(w, t)  ‖occurs(α, t1)‖,E} |= occurs(β, t2)
Again, either action can represent a test action,ψ , whereψ is a ground atom. This says that
occurs(α, t1) > occurs(β, t2) is true relative to some information state just in case β occurs
in all worlds in which the α-updated information state has been “reconstructed” to explain
the counterfactual supposition. When I write a counterfactual relative to some individual
world, I will assume that it is to be evaluated with respect to some agent’s information state
at that world, where the identity of the agent is understood by context.
5.1. Comparison to other semantics for counterfactuals
The semantics given above is strongly syntactic in the sense that the update process is
grounded in a set of initial assumptions; the need for this is driven by the requirement
discussed earlier that the form of the belief base play an important role in the choice of
closest counterfactual world. The above semantics differs from that of Kratzer [50,51] or
Ginsberg [28] in that it is here grounded in an update rather than a revision operation: it
is therefore not susceptible to the problem of incompleteness exposed by Winslett. The
intuition behind update is that the truth of a counterfactual is given relative to some set
of worlds representing ways that the actual world might have been: the counterfactual
consequences are computed in terms of the union of all of the (closest) changes to
each of those worlds. In contrast, revision assumes that the formula with which one’s
beliefs are to be revised represents some change in an incorrect set of existing beliefs.
As Winslett showed, such an operation produces counter-intuitive results when used to
represent changes in terms of actions occurring in the world. A further advantage of the
update operation is that it is not susceptible to Gärdenfors’ triviality theorem discussed
earlier. In contrast to the work of Winslett, the operation described here is syntactic which I
have argued is necessary for handling contingent generalizations correctly in counterfactual
reasoning.
In contrast, the syntactic update operation of del Val [14] requires that the updating
formula be in disjunctive normal form. This means that the syntactic form of nomic
expressions is lost and, hence, we will lose the “reason maintenance” property that Nebel
talked about [70] and that Kratzer argued was necessary. Unlike the update semantics for
counterfactuals put forward by Grahne [34], the update operation here is syntactic, for
the reasons already discussed. In addition, the semantics is given in terms of the agent’s
information state (i.e., in terms of the assumption set plus inertial assumptions) and a
representation in which events are represented at the object level. Although the work of
del Val and Shoham [15] examines correspondences between theories of change in AI and
update semantics, that work was motivated by somewhat different goals. The idea there
was that an update to a database could be modeled within a logical language in which
time was explicitly represented: each change or update corresponded to a new state change
in the temporal representation. The difference here is that to compute the counterfactual
consequences of some φ it is necessary to compute the update with respect to the entire
chronicle and not just the current state. That is, the actual chronicle is given and the update
must be expressed relative to it.
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Another interesting point is that the will depend on the counterfactual supposition and
cannot be stipulated a priori. This is an important point since work in belief revision (as
well as applications to counterfactual reasoning) has focussed on an a priori assignment of
priorities to beliefs [25].
A similar approach to the one described here, but using a less expressive language—that
of structural equations—is that of Galles and Pearl [22] who describe both probabilistic
and deterministic models of counterfactual reasoning given a causal theory.
The approach that I have adopted based on reference to some set of assumptions, A, is
not one that requires that the contents of A remain static: indeed, it is very likely that A
and  should be dynamic. For more dynamic approaches to preference orderings in belief
revision, see [96]. Finally, a multi-valued logic [30] or truth maintenance system [16,20]
would obviate the need for this though the preferences discussed in the next section would
still need to be articulated.
5.2. Causal direction
Recall the example given in the introduction that was motivated by Fine’s famous
example [19,57]:
(7) If Nixon had pressed the button there would have been a nuclear holocaust.
This counterfactual appears true. Fine points out, however, that since Nixon never
performed such an action, worlds in which there was no nuclear holocaust are much
different than the few in which there was. Consequently, an evaluation strategy that is
based simply on similarity of worlds will certainly give great weight to those similarities
involving worlds in which no holocaust occurs; that is, one in which the holocaust is
prevented, hence the counterfactual will be false. The approach presented so far based on
belief revision or information change in which similarity is determined in terms of which
formulas change truth value can also suffer from this same problem if one indiscriminately
updates the description of the real world with equal preference to the past, present, and
future: again, we will prefer that something prevent the holocaust. The way around this is
to stipulate that all of the real future is kept at lower priority than the past. Hence, we will
evaluate the consequences of the counterfactual supposition first; only those facts from the
real chronicle that do not conflict with those consequences will then be included.
The preference towards futures that are dependent on the counterfactual supposition can
be expressed as follows.
Preference 5.1 (Causal Direction I: causal inferences preferred). Given some counter-
factual query relative to an information state, σi(w, t), where t ′ is the time of the coun-
terfactual supposition, φ, in question, w′ ∈ σi(w, t), and b stands for some bounds on the
past:
P ≺ {φ ∈ Γ ∗(w′) | time of φ > t ′}
≺ {φ ∈ Γ ∗(w′) | time of φ = t ′}
≺ {φ ∈ Γ ∗(w′) | time of φ = τ, b6 τ < t ′}
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That is, the past is explained before the future is projected; persistences are, as
usual, computed last. Noticed that , when evaluating counterfactuals, depends on the
counterfactual supposition, φ, and the information state relative to which the counterfactual
is to be evaluated. When evaluating counterfactuals it is useful to place some bounds, b, on
the distance to the past that one is willing to consider.
The evaluation of predictive counterfactuals is complicated by the fact that when
considering the counterfactual consequences of some φ, we do not want to consider how φ
might have come about. That is, we prefer stability of the past. This is because any changes
to the past necessary to accommodate φ—recall the example earlier involving two lines of
dominos—might result in subsequent changes to a branch point which was a cause of both
φ and some independent condition. It is essential that one keep in mind that the source of
these preferences is the desire to develop a formalization of causation: we judge a particular
counterfactual true or false depending on whether the associated causal statement does or
does not follow.
This case can instead be handled as follows. First, the form of nomic expressions
must be modified slightly in order to localize the consequences of some counterfactual
supposition. The modification involves expressing causal rules as defaults by introducing
abnormalities [64]. Since such an approach is among one of the standard approaches for
handling the qualification problem, any assumption that causal rules are in such a form does
not represent any additional constraint imposed on the crafting of the knowledge base.
Definition 5.5 (Form of nomic expressions). Causal laws in Li (w, t) now take the form
(also ramification rules where ψ is some occurs(e, t)):
occurs(β, t)∧¬holds(ab(β,α,ψ), t) ∧ occurs(α, t)⊃Ψt ′
where t ′ > t , β can be some test action, φ?, and Ψt ′ is as in Definition 4.1.
The ab predicates condition the occurrence of each action. An ab predicate of arity
two is not sufficient because of the canonical form that nomic expressions must have (i.e.,
in terms of a single consequent). A causal rule that affected two conditions (under the
present scheme this would be expressed as two distinct rules) would then have the same
ab qualification and would therefore not serve the purpose of localizing the effect of the
causal rule. The negation of the ab predicates (over all ground atoms) is initially assumed
[28] as a sort of closed world assumption, and given lowest priority under. This illustrates
the need for functional terms corresponding to the logical connectives present within holds
statements: consider a causal law with the antecedent of the form holds(¬φ, t) . . . in which
the ab predicate must range over ¬φ.
The most basic property of our commonsense notion of causation involves direction:
the influence between cause and effect is only in one direction. The following preference
ensures that when entertaining a counterfactual supposition, ¬ψ , one does not unravel
what actually occurred, ψ , to some arbitrary past cause that also represented a cause of
another condition that was independent of ψ .
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Preference 5.2 (Causal Direction II: predictive counterfactuals). Let the time of the
counterfactual supposition, ¬ψ , be t ′ with L in the above form and σ the information
state. Let,
NegAblocal=
{¬holds(ab(χ,α, ξ), t ′ − d) |
σ |= occurs(α, t ′ − d)∧
holds(dur(α, d)∧¬ab(χ,α, ξ), t ′ − d)}
and letWD′ =WD−NegAblocal, where ab expressions are part ofWD. Then,
P ≺ NegAblocal ≺WD′
The idea is that, given some counterfactual time, t ′, and some (predictive) counterfactual
supposition, ¬ψ , when updating the information state one prefers methods of accommo-
dating¬ψ by way of assuming some localized abnormality that will defeat the (defeasible)
causal rule responsible for the change,ψ . An assumption underlying this preference is that
the description of the event in the counterfactual query is sufficiently specific in order to
distinguish it from others that occurred at the same time. Notice that even though this pref-
erence keeps the past stable, theE explanatory ordering is still necessary in the semantics
of counterfactuals: that preference supplies the means for handling the frame problem in
explanation or prediction. It is important to appreciate the fact that the combination of the
two causal direction preferences does not reduce the semantics to a standard branching
time logic. The differences are two-fold: (i) the semantics presented here incorporates a
measure of “closeness” in order to evaluate the consequences of some not(α) in a situation
in which concurrent actions are possible, and (ii) some part of the future (and not neces-
sarily all) might be inconsistent with the projection of the effects of the action referred to
by the counterfactual supposition.
This preference does not carry over to explanatory counterfactuals, however. In trying
to explain how the past might have been different, we admit any physically possible past
and usually the best we can do—without more domain-specific information—is to infer a
large disjunction.
6. Steps toward a theory of causation
As already suggested, counterfactual dependency represents a necessary but not
sufficient condition in support of a causal connection. In this section I consider additional
conditions which must be placed on any definition of causation based on the CRH. As
discussed in the introduction, two of these conditions involve restricting the causal relation
to exclude cases in which the antecedent event is either part of the consequent event or
represented a method for the consequent event.
First I define the transitive closure of counterfactual dependence, ∗>. This is necessary
as counterfactuals are inherently nonmonotonic and, hence, not generally transitive [28].
Definition 6.1 (Transitive closure of counterfactual dependence). The transitive closure,
∗
>, of > is defined by:
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w |= φ ∗>ψ iff either w |= φ >ψ or
there is some ξ such that w |= [(φ > ξ)∧ (ξ ∗>ψ)]
In addition, ∗>, is restricted to preferences for predictive counterfactuals.
The following definition will be used to block problematic cases of pre-emption
discussed in the introduction. It is defined meta-theoretically and restricts ∗> to antecedent
conditions that represent the strongest antecedent condition counterfactually related to
another.
Definition 6.2 (Strongest antecedent condition).
|= occurs(α, t1) F occurs(β, t2) def≡
∃γ1 · · · ∃γn.[2W [occurs(α, t1)⊃ occurs(γ1, t1)∨ · · · ∨ occurs(γn, t1)]
∧ (occurs(γ1, t1)∨ · · · ∨ occurs(γn, t1) ∗> occurs(β, t2))
∧ (¬(occurs(γ1, t1)∨ · · · ∨ occurs(γn, t1)) ∗>¬occurs(β, t2))]
∧¬∃γ ′1 · · ·∃¬γ ′m.[2W [(occurs(α, t1)⊃ occurs(γ ′1, t1)∨ · · · ∨ occurs(γ ′m, t1))
∧ (occurs(γ ′1, t1)∨ · · · ∨ occurs(γ ′m, t1)
⊃ occurs(γ1, t1)∨ · · · ∨ occurs(γn, t1))]
∧ ((occurs(γ ′1, t1)∨ · · · ∨ occurs(γ ′m, t1))
∗
> occurs(β, t2)
∧ (¬(occurs(γ ′1, t1)∨ · · · ∨ occurs(γ ′m, t1))
∗
>¬occurs(β, t2)))]
That is, occurs(γ1, t1) ∨ · · · ∨ occurs(γn, t1) is the strongest condition/action whose
occurrence is counterfactually related to β such that the occurrenceα entails the occurrence
of γ . The events α,β and the γ ’s are non test actions.
For example, suppose that there are two ways to win a particular chess game (β): by
taking a certain rook or by advancing a certain pawn. Then, while the negation of each
individual fact is not counterfactually related to not winning the game, the disjunction
“taking the rook or advancing the pawn” (γ ) is. Furthermore, if one of these actually
occurred—say, taking the rook (α)—then we can report (see below) that taking the rook
caused the win. In this definition, γ , can stand for a fact that reports the occurrence of
some event. In that case, γ then reports a disjunctive event. The existence of such an
event type is problematic [58]. However, this axiom does not make any claims about the
ontological status of such events. It is used rather as a means of getting around the pre-
emption problem: since α must be part of the strongest antecedent condition, the definition
will rule out cases in which α might not be counterfactually related to β simply because if
α had not obtained, it might have pre-empted some other cause that would have resulted
in β . Such cases are ruled out because we have, in effect, restricted the counterfactual
dependency in the definition for causation to classes of facts or events.
Causation can then be defined as (again, meta-theoretically):
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Definition 6.3 (Semantics for causation).
|= occurs(α, t1) causes occurs(β, t2) def≡
α 6= β ∨ t1 6= t2
∧¬holds(augmentations(α,β), t1)
∧occurs(α, t1) instrumental occurs(β, t2)
∧¬(occurs(α, t1) method occurs(β, t2))
∧¬holds(part−of (α,β), t1)
∧occurs(α, t1) F occurs(β, t2)
In words, the fact that α occurred causes it to be the case that β occurred just in case the
following conditions are met:
(1) either α and β represent distinct act-types or they occurred at different times;
(2) neither represent augmented descriptions of the other (see below), i.e., it rules out
cases such as α = e@p@q and β = e@p;
(3) α is instrumental in the performance of β (see below), i.e., this rules out cases
in which α may only have prevented β which occurred on its own (and so the
counterfactual dependence in the last clause will hold);
(4) α must not represent a method for β (see below);
(5) α is not a part of β : this precludes incorrectly classifying cases of one event being a
part of a sequence as genuinely causal; and finally
(6) the occurrence and nonoccurrence of α and β , respectively, are each counterfactu-
ally related in terms of the strongest antecedent condition, for the reasons already
discussed.
Case (4) is interesting in that examples such as the following seem just fine:
(8) Picking up the heavy sofa caused him to hurt his arm,
where “Picking up the heavy sofa” also represented a method for “hurting his arm”. I am
not sure how to handle these cases: my theory would require this last sort of example to
be reported as “Picking up the heavy sofa caused his arm to become hurt”. Whether the
example in (8) can be handled by appealing to some sort of intentionality is not clear to
me. Nevertheless, the above formulation seems to correctly handle a great number of useful
cases. 18
Causal questions involving pairs of states and not events are somewhat problematic:
certain state pairs that are counterfactually related may not reflect a genuine causal relation.
For example, the counterfactual “if the legs on that table were shorter, the table would be
lower” might very well be true, however, it would violate commonsense intuitions to say
that the length of the legs was causing the height of the table. Some state-event pairs that are
counterfactually dependent are, however, related causally: “if the temperature of the water
18 See also comments at the end of this section regarding alternative definitions for the method-of relation.
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had been lower the reactor would not have exploded” relates a fact about the world—the
temperature of the water—and an event. 19
The notion of instrumentality employed here is somewhat similar to that of Bennett [4]
who suggests identifying cases of instrumentality relative to some consequence, φ, just in
case the number of basic movements the agent could have performed that resulted in φ
is strictly smaller than the number of movements that would have resulted in ¬φ. Here,
I instead appeal to the existence predicate/function.
Definition 6.4 (Instrumentality).
|= occurs(α, t1) instrumental occurs(β, t2) def≡
(∃a.holds(agt(α, a), t1)∧ occurs(β, t2)∧ [holds(¬E(a), t1) ∗>¬occurs(β, t2)])
That is, β must occur and if the agent of α had not existed then β would not have
occurred. 20
It is also useful to extend the definition for causation to report cases in which some event
“actually” caused another. We have:
Definition 6.5 (Actually caused).
|= α caused β def≡ (α causes β)∧ α ∧ β
Shoham [80] examined a number of properties of causation: transitivity, asymmetry,
and ireflexivity. In my definition, asymmetry falls out of the preferences already discussed
and, unlike Shoham’s theory does not require the stipulation of temporal precedence
between the events involved. As such, the semantics presented here can handle cases of
simultaneous causation such as, the block scratched the table as it was dragged across
the surface. Transitivity is built into the definition of ∗> and ireflexivity falls out of the
requirement that the events be distinct.
The property of transitivity is somewhat controversial, however, and deserves comment.
For example [38]:
“. . . the cause of the motor accident may be the icy condition of the road but it would
be odd to cite the cold as the cause of the accident.”
Similarly, from the first pair of statements one should not conclude the last pair [66]:
19 Other reports involving reference to states can be handled as follows. We can say:
occurs(e, t1) causes holds(f, t2)≡
∃t.t1 6 t 6 t2 ∧ occurs(e, t) causes occurs(change(¬f ), t)
∧∀t ′ .t 6 t ′ 6 t2 holds(f, t ′)
(See also Example 7.7.)
20 Recall axiom (17).
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(9a) When John left, Sue cried. When Sue cried, her mother got upset.
(9b) When John left, Sue’s mother got upset.
These examples seem to suggest that causality is not transitive. However, Thomson [88,
pp. 61–62] and Lewis [55, pp. 214–215] blame this on a lack of distinction between
“a cause” and “the cause”. I will also assume causation is transitive and suggest that
the explanation for the compelling examples of Hart and Honore as well as Moens and
Steedman are to be found at a pragmatic level—as discussed in the introduction—which is
responsible for identifying the salient cause among a number of causal factors.
Turning now to the notion of a method for an action, we begin by first defining the notion
of augmentation: one action description augments another just in case the first represents
a more detailed description of the second. Formally,
Definition 6.6 (Augmentation of events).
|= holds(augmentations(α,β), t)≡ (holds(aguments(α,β)∨ augments(β,α), t)]
where
|= holds(augments(α@mods, α@mods′), t)≡ holds(sub−type(mods′,mods), t)
What I will call a method-of relation between actions is very similar to the generation
relation [32]. The following, somewhat tired example, should illustrate the intuition behind
generation. Consider the act of flipping some particular light switch at some particular time;
that action is said to generate the act of turning on that light at that time just as long as some
set of conditions are in force: in this case, the switch and the light must be connected and
functioning in the appropriate manner. In such a case one would say that one turned on
the light by flipping the switch. There are many ways of defining such a relation [32,43,
76,90] and the definition of causes simply requires that one have some way of blocking
the identification of cases of generation with bona fide cases of causation. The relation of
Goldman, Pollack’s and Israel et al.’s formulation to the one which follows is discussed
elsewhere [74,75]. Here, I identify a method-of relation counterfactually but require that
the agent of both actions be the same as well as the time of performance.
Definition 6.7 (Method of performing an action). Let dur(α, d) be true just in case d is
the duration of α. Then,
|= occurs(α, t) method occurs(β, t) def≡
holds(α 6= β
∧¬augmentations(α,β)
∧∃x.agt(α, x)∧ agt(β, x)
∧duration(α, d)∧ duration(β, d), t)
∧occurs(α, t) F occurs(β, t)
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That is, some α represents a method for some β just in case they are distinct, performed
by the same agent, and over the same time spans. In addition, β cannot represent a more
detailed description of α, and also α and β must be counterfactually related.
Notice that axiom in Definition 6.7 leads to a relation that is transitive, anti-symmetric,
and irreflexive. This is consistent with Goldman’s observations.
The use of α F β instead of ∗> blocks cases of pre-emption, just as in the causal case.
Consider,
(10) I won the game by taking his rook.
Given my commitment to winning, I would have chosen some other winning method if it
existed. 21
In the definition for method of, the act-types are constrained to not represent
augmentations of each other; this is done in order to treat separately cases referred to as
augmentation generation [32]. These are cases relating the italicized descriptions below in
the manner indicated:
(11) ??John ran quickly by running.
This case of the by-locution does not sit comfortably with Goldman’s other examples. In
my opinion they should be handled separately as adverb-dropping inferences [13].
Since the definition does not require that one identify some basic action that is related
to the higher-level action (as, for example, Israel et al. [43] does), the definition correctly
handles cases involving nonmovement and negative actions:
(12a) He angered the teacher by not answering the question.
(12b) He kept the coffee from spilling by maintaining the cup steady.
(12c) He prevented the flood by closing the gates.
In the first example, if he had answered the question, he would not have angered the
teacher; the event subsumption is therefore handled without having one’s knowledge base
include a statement that specifically relates the two act-types in the manner indicated. All
three illustrate that not every action can be equated with a case of bringing about some
condition. The events in question also cannot be identified with a state change; in the first
two, the world remains visibly the same even though “something is happening”. In the
second case, there need not be any observable change in the position of the cup. In the
third, the action that is prevented never occurs.
7. Benchmark problems
Two approaches to the evaluation of theories of action in AI have been put forward
in the past. One involves the use of benchmark problems to illustrate certain aspects of
21 I am grateful to Mark Steedman for this example. This formulation therefore addresses criticisms leveled on
counterfactual treatments of generation [7,33,76].
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reasoning about action that any theory should solve [79,86]. Another, more recent approach
centers on the identification of meta-theorems that relate one formalism to another; the
latter approach has been most notable in the development of action languages [26,61,
78]. In this paper, I adopt the former, example-based approach. The following benchmarks
correspond to the examples discussed in the introduction. For ease of reference, the axioms
corresponding to those examples are repeated in Fig. 4.
Example 7.1 (Frame problem—prediction). Consider the problem of showing that the σ
corresponding toWDchain and L is the intuitive one in which all of the dominos fall.
Proof. For brevity, I will enumerate the list of formulas below consisting of holds(up(x), t),
holds(next(x, y), t), and occurs( fall(x), t) statements by way of a list consisting of in-
stead Ut(x), Nt(x, y), and F t(x) statements, respectively. Let Worlds = ‖WDchain ∪ L
∪Ch‖. 22 Consider the set, H , of ground atoms:
H =WDchain ∪{¬F 1(x), x 6=A,
¬U2(A),U2(B),U2(C),U2(D),U2(E),U2(F ),U2(G),U2(H),
F 2(B),¬F 2(x), x 6=B,
¬U3(A),¬U3(B),U3(C),U3(D),U3(E),U3(F ),U3(G),U3(H),
F 3(C),F 3(E),¬F 3(x), x 6=C,E,
¬U4(A),¬U4(B),¬U4(C),U4(D),¬U4(E),U4(F ),U4(G),U4(H),
F 4(D),F 4(F ),¬F 4(x), x 6=D,F,
¬U5(A),¬U5(B),¬U5(C),¬U5(D),¬U5(E),¬U5(F ),U5(G),U5(H),
F 5(G),¬F 5(x), x 6=G,
¬U6(A),¬U6(B),¬U6(C),¬U6(D),¬U6(E),¬U6(F ),¬U6(G),U6(H),
F 6(H),¬F 6(x), x 6=H,
¬Us(A),¬Us(B),¬Us(C),¬Us(D),¬Us(E),¬Us(F),¬Us(G),¬Us(H),
¬Fs(x),∀x, s > 7,
Nt (A,B),Nt (B,C),Nt (C,D),Nt (B,E),Nt (E,F),
Nt (F,G),Nt (G,H),Nt(D,G),∀t,
¬Nt(A,xA), xA 6=B,¬Nt(B,xB), xB 6=C,E,¬Nt(C,xC), xC 6=D,
¬Nt(E,xE), xE 6= F,¬Nt (F,xF ), xF 6=G,
¬Nt(G,xG), xG 6=H,¬Nt(D,xD), xD 6=G,∀t
}∪{
occurs(change(up(x)), t) | F t (x)}
22 Recall that the set Ch stands for every instance of occurs(change(φ), t), where φ changes truth value at time t .
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WDchain={occurs( fall(A),1)} ∪ Pos∪ Locs
Obj={A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H }
Pos={holds(up(x),1) | x ∈Obj}
Locs={holds(next(A,B),1),holds(next(B,C),1),holds(next(C,D),1),
holds(next(B,E),1),holds(next(E,F),1),holds(next(F,G),1),
holds(next(G,H),1),holds(next(D,G),1)}
WDexplain={occurs( fall(A),1),¬occurs( fall(H),6)} ∪ Pos∪ Locs
WDbranch={occurs( fall(F ),1),occurs( fall(C),1)} ∪ Pos∪ Locs
WDtrio={occurs( fall(C),1),occurs( fall(D),1),occurs( fall(E),1)} ∪ Pos∪ Locs
WDslide={holds(touching,1),occurs(slide,1)}
L={holds(up(x), t)∧ occurs( fall(x), t)⊃¬holds(up(x), t + 1),
occurs( fall(x), t)∧ holds(next(x, y), t)∧ holds(up(y), t)
⊃ occurs( fall(y), t + 1)} ∪Dom
Dom={x 6= y | x ∈Obj & y ∈Obj− {x}}
∪ {t 6= t ′ | t ∈N& t ′ ∈N− {t}}
∪ { fall(r)= fall(s)⊃ r = s}
∪ {∀x.x =A∨ x =B ∨ x =C ∨ x =D ∨ x =E
∨x = F ∨ x =G∨ x =H }
∪ {t = 1∨ t = 2∨ · · · ∨ t = n | n ∈N}
Ltrio={occurs(trio−fall(x, y, z), t)≡
occurs( fall(x), t)∧ occurs( fall(y), t)∧ occurs( fall(z), t)} ∪L
Lslide={occurs(slide, t)∧ holds(touching, t)⊃ occurs(scratched, t)} ∪Dom
Lchild={occurs(knockdown(i, x), t)∧ holds(φ, t)⊃ occurs(disobeys(i), t),
occurs(knockdown(i, x), t)∧ holds(φ, t)⊃ occurs(punish(Me, i), t + 1),
occurs(knockdown(i, x), t)∧ holds(up(x), t)⊃¬holds(up(x), t + 1)} ∪Dom
Fig. 4. Benchmark axioms.
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Clearly, Cn(H ∪L∪Ch)= Γ (w) for some w ∈Worlds. Let H =Herb(Γ (w)).
Claim. σ = {w}.
To prove this claim we need to show that min{Worlds,E} = {w}. First, put Γ (w) in
standard form,
Γ ∗(w)=N ∪ premises(w) ∪L∪ (P ∩ Γ (w)) ∪NC,
where premises(w)=WDchain and P ∩ Γ (w)=P −P− such that
NC= {¬occurs(change(φ), t) | holds(φ, t)⊃ holds(φ, t + 1) ∈P −P−}
with
P− = {holds(up(A),1)⊃ holds(up(A),2),
holds(up(B),2)⊃ holds(up(B),3),
holds(up(x),3)⊃ holds(up(x),4), x =C,E,
holds(up(y),4)⊃ holds(up(y),5), y =D,F,
holds(up(G),5)⊃ holds(up(G),6),
holds(up(H),6)⊃ holds(up(H),7)}
N = {¬occurs( fall(A), tA),26 tA 6 7,
¬occurs( fall(B), tB), tB = 1,36 tB 6 7,
¬occurs( fall(x), tCE),16 tCE 6 2,46 tCE 6 7, x =E,C,
¬occurs( fall(y), tDF),16 tDF 6 3,56 tDF 6 7, x =D,F,
¬occurs( fall(G), tG),16 tG 6 4,66 tG 6 7,
¬occurs( fall(H), tH ),16 tH 6 5, tH = 7}
Since the elements of N are not supported they are included in Γ ∗. In terms of epistemic
support, we have:
|unsup(w)| = 0
Recall, that the E ordering is defined in terms of lack of epistemic support for positive
ground terms. For example, we have that occurs( fall(D),4) is nomically supported be-
cause occurs( fall(A),1) /∈ Γ ∗(w) ∼ occurs( fall(D),4) and occurs( fall(A),1) ∈ Γ ∗(w).
In contrast, we have that occurs( fall(E),4) is not epistemically supported and hence, by
theE-minimality condition, worlds in which its negation hold are preferred. Similarly for
the other formulas in Γ ∗(w): for example, holds(next(A,C),1) is not supported, hence its
negation is preferred.
To show that there are no other minimal models, notice that the negation of any
formula φ = ¬occurs( fall(z), tz) ∈ N where z 6= A, could only be nomically supported
in a possible world, u, if occurs( fall(A), t ′) where t ′ < tz. This is because the only nomic
expression in which a fall can be deduced is our law for causal chains. But this would imply
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that occurs( fall(A), t ′) for some t ′ 6= 1, which is not so and which, in turn, would not be
supported. Clearly, the locations of each of the dominos also remains unchanged. Suppose
they did not. Then we would either have an unsupported (occurs(change(next(x, y)), t) for
some x,y and t (for example, that next(A,B) no longer held at time t) or a new holds term
with a positive occurrence of next, which would also be unsupported. We therefore have
that σ |= occurs( fall(H),6). 2
Example 7.2 (Frame problem—explanation). Consider the problem of explanation de-
scribed byWDexplain in which we need to explainH not falling at the end of the chronicle.
We wish to show that any explanation is not chronologically biased.
Proof. We have that the information state consists of world(s), w, such thatWDexplain ∪
L⊆ Γ (w). By the contrapositive of the rule for chains in L, the only way for a fall of H not
to occur at time 6 is if one of the dominos falls earlier than it should have, or if the positions
or locations of the dominos change. Any of these possibilities are equally unsupported
(although their consequences would be supported). Therefore, unlike approaches based on
chronological minimization, EUT does not prefer worlds in which the aberrant fall of H
occurs as late as possible (i.e., at time 5). 2
Example 7.3 (Nondeterministic actions and disjunctive support). Consider a situation in
which a domino is dropped on a checkerboard and in which the domino can fall in one of
three ways: either entirely on top of a black square, a white square, or over part of both a
black and a white square. Suppose we axiomatize this as follows.
WD= {occurs(Drop,1),holds(¬holds(Black,1),¬holds(White,1)}
L= {occurs(Drop, t)⊃ holds(Black, t + 1)∨ holds(White, t + 1)}
where Drop,White, and Black refer to the dropping action, the state of the domino being on
a white square, and the state of the domino being on a black square, respectively. Consider
the following three worlds:
Γ ∗(u)=WD ∪ {holds(Black,2),holds(¬White,2)} ∪L
Γ ∗(v)=WD ∪ {holds(Black,2),holds(White,2)} ∪L
Γ ∗(w)=WD ∪ {holds(¬Black,2),holds(White,2)} ∪L
We have that σ = {u,v,w} and each of u,v, and w, have no unsupported formulas. For
example, holds(Black,2) /∈ Γ ∗(v) ∼ R, where R is the nomic expression for dropping.
Similarly, for u and w.
Example 7.4 (Predictive counterfactuals and causal direction). The problem here is to
ascertain the truth of,
σ |= ¬occurs( fall(C),3) > occurs( fall(E),3)
That is, we wish to show that C’s falling had nothing to do with E’s falling.
Proof. The elements of L are modified as indicated:
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holds(up(x)∧¬ab(up(x), fall(x),¬up(x)), t)∧ occurs( fall(x), t)
⊃ holds(¬up(x), t + 1)
occurs( fall(x), t)∧ holds(next(x, y)∧ up(y)∧¬ab( fall(x),next(x, y)
∧up(y), fall(y)), t)⊃ occurs( fall(y), t + 1)
(Recall, the symbol ∧ is being used interchangeably for conjunction at both the object and
meta-level.) By definition, the given counterfactual is true just in case,
min
{
σ  ‖¬occurs( fall(C),3)‖,E
} |= occurs( fall(E),3)
where
σ  ∥∥¬occurs( fall(C),3)∥∥=⋃
i∈σ
min
{‖¬occurs( fall(C),3)‖,vi }
By definition, this picks the worlds whose Γ ∗ has as much of Γ ∗(v) as consistent with
¬occurs( fall(C),3), where σ = {v},and Γ (v) is just like Γ (w) in Example 7.1 with the
addition of the negated abnormalities (since we assume ¬ab(φ, ., .) for each φ). Let
U = σ  ∥∥¬occurs( fall(C),3)∥∥
for all u ∈U ,
S = {¬holds(ab( fall(B),next(B,C)∧ up(B), fall(C)),2)}
and
Ab= {holds(ab( fall(B),next(B,C)∧ up(B), fall(C)),2)}.
Then,
Γ ∗(u)⊇ Γ ∗(v)− S ∪ Ab
by the Causal Direction II preference, since we will assume holds(ab( fall(B),next(B,C)∧
up(B), fall(C)),2) since an assumption of holds(ab( fall(B),next(B,E) ∧ up(B),
fall(E)),2) would just be an additional unsupported abnormality. Minimizing relative to
E , we prefer persistence of C and D’s up position, that is, let
{x} =min{σ  ‖¬occurs( fall(C),3),E ‖}
such that
Γ ∗(x)= Γ ∗(v)− S ∪Ab
∪{holds(up(x), t)⊃ holds(up(x), t + 1) | x =C,D,∀t}
∪{¬occurs( fall(x), t) | x =C,D∀t}.
Clearly, x = min{σ  ‖¬occurs( fall(C),3)‖,E} since x contains all of Γ ∗(v) except
for the abnormality. Since x |= occurs( fall(E),3), the counterfactual holds. Similarly, we
have that
σ |= ¬occurs( fall(C),3) > occurs( fall(B),2)
as desired. 2
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Notice that in making causal judgments we restrict ourselves to the preferences specified
for predictive counterfactuals and apply those even to test cases such as these in which the
counterfactual is technically in explanatory form.
Example 7.5 (Ramifications and counterfactuals). Consider the following addition to L
of the following ramification rule (“an alarm rings if C falls”):
occurs( fall(C), t)⊃ occurs(alarm, t)
and in whichWDchain remains unchanged. Consider the counterfactual:
¬(¬occurs( fall(C),3) > occurs(alarm,3))
The question posed here is whether the ramification, occurs(alarm,3) would nevertheless
occur.
Proof. The information state is represented by a world, y , such that Γ ∗(y) is exactly like
Γ ∗(x) in the previous example with the exception that the above rule is included. Since the
set of premises are of a particular syntactic form and bias our choice of closest worlds (via
the order) and since occurs(alarm,6) is supported, it is not in Γ ∗(y); consequently all
that we will be able to conclude is:
¬occurs( fall(C),3) >¬occurs(alarm,3)
If, however, we include the explanatory rule:
LE = {occurs( fall(x), t)⊃ holds(movable(x), t)}
and we consider the counterfactual consequences of H not falling, we will have,
nevertheless, that H remains movable: that is, we will not lose information. This is
because the last clause of the definition for Γ ∗(x) requires that φ ∈ Γ ∗(x) if ∃R ∈
LE.(Φ(x)− {φ,R}) 6|= φ, where φ = holds(movable(C),3). Letting R be the above rule,
then φ ∈ Γ ∗(x). 2
Example 7.6 (Explanatory counterfactuals). This counterfactual query is an explanatory
one, “what would have had to have been the case if domino C did not fall?” We wish to
show that the theory does not sanction the conclusion that the past remains the same.
Proof. Recall that the preference to an abnormality does not carry forth to cases of
explanatory counterfactuals; the best we can do is conclude a disjunction of possibilities
from the past that could explain the counterfactual supposition. In this case, we have the
same σ as in Example 7.1 and,
min{σ  ‖¬occurs( fall(C),3)‖,E}
is the set of worlds in which either A does not fall at time 1, the negation of one
of the elements of N held before time 3, an abnormality disabled the chain, or one
of Locs,Pos changed. Therefore, in considering the counterfactual, the following is the
strongest conclusion we can make:
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σ |= ¬occurs( fall(C),3) >
[¬occurs( fall(A),1)∨¬holds(next(B,C),1)
∨¬holds(next(A,B),1)∨¬holds(up(A),1)∨¬holds(up(B),1)
∨¬holds(up(C),1)∨ holds(ab( fall(A),up(B)∧ next(A,B), fall(B)),1)
∨holds(ab( fall(B),next(B,C)∧ up(B), fall(C)),2)]
as expected. 2
Example 7.7 (Preemption). Cases such as those described byWDbranch∪L are represen-
tative of preemptive causes. As discussed earlier, the proper analysis of these can depend
on the form of the counterfactual. In the case ofWDbranch, there is no real problem since
the caused event (the fall ofG) would occur at a different time in the counterfactual world.
Other cases in which the preempted event is contemporaneous with the preempting event
draw on the idea of the strongest antecedent condition. For example,
(13) Driving at 80 miles per hour caused him to get a ticket
in which driving at 79 miles per hour, for example, would have just as easily resulted in a
ticket. 23 The following is a sketch of how such an example might be axiomatized.
WD= {holds(speed(80),1),occurs(drive,1)}
L= {holds(speed(x)≡ x = 1⊕ x = 2⊕ · · · ⊕ x =Max,1),
occurs(drive, t)∧ holds(speed(x)∧ x > 55, t)⊃ holds(ticket, t + 1)}
where Max is the maximum speed of the car. Then the causal query would correspond to:
σ |= holds(speed(80),1) F holds(ticket, t + 1)
Here, the strongest antecedent condition is γ = speed(56)∨speed(57)∨· · ·∨speed(Max).
Example 7.8 (Event decomposition). Consider the scenario described by WDtrio and
Ltrio in which dominos C,D,E fall simultaneously at time 1.
The definition for causation explicitly excludes cases in which one event is part
of another. In our example, the fact that the falling of domino D is a part of the
trio−fall(C,D,E) event is grounds for rejecting it as a cause of the latter.
Example 7.9 (Simultaneous causation). Consider the scenario described by Lslide and
WDslide. We would like to report a causal connection between the sliding and the
scratching while blocking a causal connection between the scratching and the sliding.
Proof. We rewrite the nomic expression in the form:
23 The counterfactual, “if he had not driven 80 miles per hour . . . ” translates to “if he had driven but not at
80 miles per hour . . . ”, given the narrow scope assumed for negation in this paper.
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occurs(slide, t)∧ holds(touching∧¬ab(slide, touching, scratched ), t)
⊃ occurs(scrached, t)
and let WD′slide = holds(¬ab(slide, touching, scratched ),1) ∪ WDslide. Let σ = {w}
where,
Γ ∗(w)=WD′slide ∪Lslide ∪P
The semantics for causation is not restricted to nonsimultaneous actions, therefore, the
report that assigns the sliding of the domino to the scratching of the surface is true:
σ |= ¬occurs(slide,1) >¬occurs(scratched,1)
(Note that this conclusion would not follow from the standard approach of Ginsberg: it
follows here because we take the E-minimal worlds and that allows us to conclude the
negation of occurs(scratched,1). Otherwise, we would only be able to prove something
much weaker, i.e., that it was not the case that if there were no sliding then there
would be no scratching). In the opposite direction, we take the counterfactual query,
¬occurs(scratched, t), and note once again that our preferential semantics assigns higher
preference to worlds in which an abnormality explains the counterfactual supposition: this
blocks the conclusion of reverse causation. 2
Example 7.10 (Event naming: method of relations). Consider Lchild describing the
additional actions of knocking down a domino and disobeying. We wish to make certain
that the semantics for causation blocks reports that assign the knocking down of domino A
by the child as a cause of the child disobeying.
Proof. It is clear, from the distinction drawn in this paper between method-of relations and
bona fide causal relations, that the truth of the counterfactual:
¬occurs(knockdown(Child,A), t) >¬occurs(disobey(Child), t)
would support only the method-of analysis: both actions are performed by the same agent,
at the same time. 2
The following example makes use of the following preference.
Preference 7.1 (Causal knowledge preferred). Let LE stand for a body of explanatory
knowledge. Then,
P ≺LE ≺WD≺L
That is, beliefs that represent causal knowledge are updated first, then the world
description, explanatory knowledge and finally inertial inferences. Note that ramification
rules are not viewed here as explanatory rules.
Example 7.11 (Explanatory knowledge). Let LE be the following explanatory rule:
LE = {holds(¬up(H), t)⊃ holds(¬up(A), t)}
C.L. Ortiz Jr. / Artificial Intelligence 108 (1999) 125–178 173
withWD now just Pos∪ Locs∪ {holds(up(x), t) | ∀x}. We wish to show that it is not the
case that “if block H falls then block A will be down” or, by the CRH, that the fall of block
H will cause the fall of block A.
Proof. Consider the counterfactual supposition, occurs( fall(H),1). Our preference order-
ing,, requires thatWD, L be added before the above explanatory rule and since that rule
is not consistent with the consequences of knocking down block H and the existingWD,
it will not be added. Hence, we will have:
σ |= ¬(occurs( fall(H),6) >¬holds(up(A),7))
as desired. 2
Example 7.12 (Fine example). Consider the case in which,
WDfine = {¬occurs( fall(A),1),¬occurs( fall(B),2), . . . ,¬occurs( fall(H),6)}
∪Locs∪ Pos
with Lfine =L. We wish to show that
occurs( fall(A),1) > occurs( fall(H),6)
Proof. As discussed in the introduction, the problem here is that there are several ways
one could explain the rest of WDfine given the counterfactual supposition: by denying
holds(up(B),2), by denying holds(next(A,B),1), etc., or by assuming an abnormality,
holds(ab( fall(A),up(B) ∧ next(A,B), fall(B)),1), etc. None of these we will sanction
the desired conclusion, that the row of dominos falls. Notice that an explicit reason
maintenance system or an approach in which truth values could be assigned to formulas
taken from a set of supporting formulas [29] would not help here as a decision would still
have to be made regarding which of the alternatives to choose. 24 However, the Causal
Direction I preference requires that we compute the consequences of dominoA falling and
then add as much ofWDfine from time point 2 on to the resulting chronicle: in this case,
¬occurs( fall(B),2), etc, would be deleted. Since only Pos,Locs,Dom is consistent with
these additions, only they would be added and the counterfactual would follow. 2
8. Summary of preferences
Since the ordering must be total, we need to constrain it further. The following appears
to be a reasonable way to accomplish this. Let Past, Now, Future stand for the contents of
Γ ∗ whose time point is either in the past, present, or future, respectively. Let NegAbLocal
stand for the local negated abnormality statements and let NegAb stand for all others.
Finally, let Ex stand for the set of existence axioms. Then, for predictive counterfactuals,
we have that:
P ≺LE ≺ NegAb≺ Future≺NegAbLocal ≺Now≺ Past≺ Ex≺L
24 If some information is given without its causal history (i.e., its justification information) such an approach
does not help at all.
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The intuition here is that we first add laws and then the actual past and present. This
is because of the very nature of predictive counterfactuals. We then consider the local
abnormalities that might disable a fluent in order to accommodate some counterfactual
supposition: this is necessary in order to avoid tracing back to a branch point. We then add
as much of the real future as we can: as we saw in the last example, some or all of this
might be inconsistent with the conclusions that follow from the belief base at this point.
Finally, we add as much of the remaining negated abnormalities, explanatory knowledge,
and persistence assumptions as is consistent.
9. Summary and conclusions
The theory presented in this paper extends existing work in counterfactual reasoning
and causation in a number of ways. I hope in the first place to have made a strong case for
the utility of counterfactual reasoning in the process of causal attribution: as we saw, since
primitive causal knowledge (that is, what I have called L) cannot instantiate every possible
description for an event, reasoning about counterfactual worlds plays an indispensable role
in choosing the proper event description and thereby addresses the inherent opacity of
causal reports. In addition, the definition of many terms that comprise the language with
which we draw attention to a variety of types of causal connections in the commonsense
world can be expressed naturally in terms of whatever role was played by one action in
the occurrence of another; the role of an action, in turn, is naturally expressed in terms of
what would otherwise have happened, that is, in counterfactual terms. I then described a
rich representation language,HL, in which counterfactual and causal dependencies could
be expressed by way of reference to events, facts, and times at the object level.
I then applied the Ramsey test to problems of counterfactual reasoning; the ordering on
belief states was chosen carefully so that an updated belief state reflect some degree of
veridicality with respect to the intended application. I labeled this problem the preference
problem for counterfactuals. Having the goal of a commonsense theory of causation,
the preferences imposed on belief sets were chosen so that the conclusions involving
counterfactuals sanctioned by such an ordering would conform to commonsense intuitions
regarding causation. Specifically, I demonstrated the need for a number of preferences
in the context of causal reasoning. The simplest preference was the priority assigned to
causal knowledge: such knowledge is always protected. In addition, one prefers alternative
worlds in which the objects referred to by the counterfactual supposition also exist. One
preference related to the direction of causation emerged: in updating a belief set one
should prefer local changes in order to accommodate the counterfactual supposition as
otherwise one might either: (i) unravel the past up to some branch point that represented a
common cause of some other, unrelated fact about the world (in terms of the counterfactual
supposition), or (ii) incorrectly allow cases of reverse causation. This preference was
handled by requiring that one’s causal knowledge take on a particular form—one in which
abnormality predicates were introduced to qualify the antecedents of causal rules. I pointed
out that such an assumption did not introduce any special additional requirements as it has
been been proposed by others as necessary in order to handle the qualification problem. An
additional preference related to causal direction orders causal inferences over unexplained
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facts from the actual world description. This amounts to requiring that in updating a set of
beliefs with some counterfactual supposition one should update the future only after having
updated the past and present as otherwise facts about the future might incorrectly bear on
which facts to retain or discard in order to accommodate the counterfactual supposition.
The motivation for these preferences came from problems in counterfactual reasoning and
are unrelated to the various mechanisms that have been proposed to encode directionality
into causal rules [89]. Those approaches are neutral with respect to the question of how to
reconcile a counterfactual supposition with one’s other beliefs.
These preferences together with a semantics for counterfactuals was then applied to
the semantics of causation. The resulting formulation ruled out cases in which method-
of or part-of relations between actions might be incorrectly identified as genuine causal
connections. In addition, the counterfactual dependency which underlies the definition of
causation was given in terms of antecedent classes of event types. This was important in
order to solve the problem of pre-emption or causal overdetermination.
This analysis was conducted within EUT which incorporates a novel combination of
techniques from the theory of information change with causal theories in AI. The former
is used to formalize the idea of minimal information loss between states of the world
as a way of dealing with the frame problem. EUT’s notion of support together with its
syntactic definition of update corrects the following previously unreported problems with
MAT while keeping intact MAT’s intuitively compelling causal preference:
(1) unexplainable events (MAT’s persistence rules limit it to only explainable events);
(2) explanation in the context of incompletely specified causal chains (in EUT a fact
supported by some unsupported fact is supported);
(3) unmotivated facts as well as actions;
(4) event ramifications (ramifications in EUT are supported);
(5) support in terms of event types instead of tokens.
EUT has also been tested successfully on a number of standard benchmarks such as the
Yale Shooting Problem, the Stanford Murder Mystery, and the Russian Turkey Shoot [74].
Finally, by incorporating EUT into the semantics of counterfactuals I showed how certain
possible worlds or alternative belief sets could be discounted by virtue of the fact that they
involved additional assumptions that were unsupported, representing “magical” and not
causally justified changes to the world.
A companion paper extends this work further to the formalization of a commonsense
language involving terms such as prevents, maintains, helps, hinders, lets, enables, forces,
etc; a fragment of which was implemented within a microworld involving agents involved
in goal-directed behavior [75].
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